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As the title implies, this thesis deals with
the Wagner Act a New Deal Labor Law.
Within the last few months, the Supreme Court
of the United States has dealt disastrously with
the Roosevelt Administration and Its plans. We
have seen the National Industrial Recovery Act and
the Agricultural Adjustment Act ruled unconstitu-
tional. With such precedents, like decisions on
other New Deal legislation will undoubtedly follow.
In this report, we are not concerned with the
issue of justifying one of the two sides; that is,
the New Deal legislation or the Constitution. We
are concerned, however, with an act, the National
Labor Relations Act commonly known as the Wagner
Act, which endeavors, by means of government inter-
vention, to better employer-employee relationship.
Labor relationship has been a problem since
time immemorial; there has always been a conflict
between both groups and it seems that as long as
we hold to our present system, conflict between both
groups is inevitable. If such a premise ‘is true,
labor leaders (including the Government) should not
attempt to end such conflict for they often in-
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crsase the friction; but rather, labor leaders should
concern themselves with the problem of lessening the
degree and causes of conflict between both groups.
The Wagner Act is an attempt on the part of the
Government to do that very thing. It has its ad-
vantages and its disadvantages; it certainly has
its ttWagnerites n and its enemies. The future of the
Act is uncertain. Therefore, the best that this
thesis can do is to set forth the theory of the Act,
the constitutional basis of the Act and the effects
of the Act, immediate and ultimate, on the employers,






HISTORY OF THE WAGNER ACT
No thesis would seem complete if it were lack-
ing in a review, brief as it may be, of how the topic
has developed. Consequently, the purpose of this
chapter is to give a brief review of the proper back-
ground belonging to the Wagner Bill, for although the
Act was made law July 5, 1935, it is really a result
of preceding laws which were faulty in method and
procedure. It is well, then, to note exactly how
the Wagner Bill has evolved.
On March 1, 1934, the original Wagner Bill,
known as "Senate 2926" was introduced in the Senate
by Senator Robert F. Wagner. The purpose of the Bill
was "to equalize the bargaining power of employers and
employees, to encourage the amicable settlement of
disputes between employers and employees, to create a
National Labor Board, and for other purposes." (1)
The original bill was presented in three parts.
"Title I" cites the name of the Act as the "Labor
Disputes Act" and gives an explanation of why the Act
is very important. "The tendency of modern economic
life toward integration and centralized control has
long since destroyed the balance of bargaining power
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between the individual employer and the individual
employee, and has rendered the individual, unorganized
worker helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract,
to secure a just reward for his services, and to pre-
serve a decent standard of living, with a consequent
detriment to the general welfare and the free flow of
commerce. Inadequate recognition of the right of
employees to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing has been one of the causes
of strikes, lockouts, and similar manifestations of
economic strife, obstructing commerce and imperiling
the general welfare. It is hereby declared to be the
policy of Congress to remove obstructions to the free
flow of commerce, to encourage the establishment of
uniform labor standards, and to provide for the general
welfare, by removing the obstacles which prevent the
organization of labor for the purpose of cooperative
action in maintaining its standards of living, by en-
couraging the equalization of the bargaining power of
employers and employees, and by providing agencies for
the peaceful settlement of disputes.” (2)
Section 3 of Title I defines the terras. (3)
The unfair labor practices are listed in Section
5 of Title I. Briefly, the provisions 3tate that it
was unfair labor practice for an employer
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l/ to attempt to impair the right of em-
ployees to organize and join labor organizations, and
to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of
organizing and bargaining collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing or for other purposes
of mutual aid or protection.
2/ to refuse to recognize, deal with
representatives of his employees, and to fail to exert
every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements
with such representatives.
3/ to participate or influence in the
formation of any labor organization.
4/ to contribute financial or other material
support to any labor organization.
5/ to engage in any discriminatory practice
which encourages membership or non-membership in any
labor organization.
"Title II" of the original bill established a
National Labor Board and stipulated the powers of the
Board. The Board was to consist of seven members ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate. Two of the members were to represent
the employers; two to represent the employees and three
as representatives of the general public. Members
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representing the general public were to be paid ten
thousand dollars each year for a term of five years.
be
The others were to^paid twenty-five dollars per day
when attending meetings of the Board, and were to be
chosen for a period of one year. The principal of-
fice of the Board was to be in the District of Columbia
and the Board could, "either by itself or through its
agents, offer its services to the parties to any labor
dispute as conciliator or mediator in such disputes,
and act as conciliator for the parties who accept such
offer". (4) The Board was to be empowered to prevent
any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice
that burdens or affects commerce or obstructs the free
flow of commerce or tends to lead to such results.
Also, when any parties to a labor dispute agreed to
submit to the arbitration of the Board and the latter
accepted such submission, any agreement was "valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable."
Under "Title III" of the original bill, it was
the intent of Senator Wagner to create in the Depart-
ment of Labor a United States Conciliation Service,
under the direction of a Director of Conciliation who
was to be appointed by the Secretary of Labor. The
purpose of this appointment was to offer its services
to the parties of any labor dispute and to attempt to
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adjust such disputes by conciliation and mediation
or by arranging for voluntary arbitration.
While the hearings on the original bill were in
progress. Senator Wagner introduced a substitute bill.
After extensive hearings on the substituted bill, the
Committee on Education and Labor rewrote the bill re-
taining the essential principles and making some changes
that were not of material consequence. The bill is
known on record as Substitute Bill of May 26, 1934,
No. 1260 of the Seventy-third Congress, second session.
The purpose of the substituted bill was " to equalize
the bargaining power of employers and employees, to
promote the amicable settlement of disputes between
the employers and employees, to create a National
Labor Board and for other purposes”'. (5) In purpose,
the substituted bill differs from the original bill
of March 1, 1934 by the substitution of one word; the
original bill read "to encourage the amicable settle-
ment of disputes, etc." while the substituted bill
read "to promote the amicable settlement of disputes."
Section 1 of the Act declared it "to be the policy
of the United States to remove unnecessary obstructions
to the free flow of commerce, to encourage the esta-
blishment of uniform labor standards, and to provide

- 8 -
for the general welfare, by establishing agencies for
the peaceful settlement of labor disputes". (6)
The definitions of terms as used in the Act are
given in Section 2. (7)
Under the Substitute Bill, it was to be unfair
labor practice
l/ for an employer to attempt to impair
the right of employees to form or join a labor organi-
zation of their own choosing.
2/ for employees to attempt to impair the
right of employers to form or join employer-organiza-
tions of their own choosing.
3/ for an employer to interfere with or
dominate the administration of any labor organization.
4/ for an employer, by discrimination in
regard to employment or terms of employment, to en-
courage or discourage membership in any labor
organization;
The substituted bill created in the Department
of Labor a Board known as the "National Industrial
Adjustment Board" composed of five members appointed
by the President with the consent of the Senate. Three
of the members were to represent the general public
with one of them acting as chairman of the Board. Each
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of the three members was to receive a salary of ten
thousand dollars a year. Furthermore, the President
was to appoint for terms of one year, six individuals
to represent the employees and six to represent em-
ployers; these twelve persons would usually be chosen
from organized representatives of employees and
employers. The chairman of the Board could select
two individuals from such representation; one for
employers and one for employees thus completing the
Board of five members. The two individuals selected
were to be paid twenty dollars a day when engaged in
the performance of their duties.
In order to prevent any unfair labor practices,
the Board was empowered to prevent any person from
engaging in any of the practices that has led or
threatens to lead to a labor dispute that might affect
commerce or obstruct the free flow of commerce. If
anyone failed or neglected to obey the orders of the
Board, "the Board may petition any circuit court of
appeals of the United States for the enforcement of
such orders". (8) The Board was also empowered to
act as arbitrator in labor disputes when parties agreed
to submit to such arbitration. Any such voluntary
agreement became "valid, irrevocable and enforceable
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save upon such grounds as exist at lav/ or in equity
for the revocation of any contract 1 '
.
( 9)
If any dispute arose as to who were the re-
presentatives of the employees, the Board had the
power under the act to investigate such disputes
and certify to the conflicting parties the individual
or labor organization that would represent the employees
In order to accomplish its purposes better, the
Board had certain investigatory powers. For example,
any member of the Board could require by subpena the
attendance and testimony of witnesses; a member could
require documentary evidence relating to any matter
under a complaint; any and all of such agents or wit-
nesses were to be reimbursed for all expenses. The
Board eould further require from any department or
agencies of the Government any information they may
have for the better fulfillment of the Board's purposes.
Under the Substitute Bill, reports were to be
presented to Congress at the end of each fiscal year
stating in detail the cases it had heard, the decisions
it had rendered, the names, salaries and duties of all
employers and officers in the employ, and an account
of all the money it had reimbursed.
The' limitations of the Board were that the employee
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could not be required "to render labor or service
without his consent, to authorize the issuance of
any order or injunction requiring such service, or
to make illegal the failure or refusal of any em-
ployee individually, or any number of employees
collectively, to render labor or service." (10)
Although the Substitute Bill was an improvement
over the original bill, it failed, nevertheless, to
do or try to do certain things. Nothing in the bill
allowed the Board or its agencies to fix or to re-
gulate rates of pay, to limit the hours of work, to
affect or govern sanitary or similar working conditions
in a place of employment.
The bill did not relate to employment of a
domestic servant, or an agricultural laborer; in fact,
it did not relate to any establishment employing less
than tne persons.
Nothing in the bill required an employee to join
any form of labor organization; and if employees
chose to organize, nothing in the bill prevented them
from so doing in whatever system or form they desired.
If the employees chose to belong to any organi-
zation, there was nothing in the bill compelling an
employer to enter into agreements with the organization.
I
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The bill did not prevent grievances or disputes
from being settled locally; in fact, it fostered such
settlements since the Board was explicitly not going
to settle all labor grievances.
Finally, the bill did not provide unusual powers
to the Board; the Board was restricted to only four
unfair labor practices; "every power granted to the
Board with respect to the taking of testimony, summon-
ing of witnesses, and like matters, is duplicated in
at least a majority, if not all, of the federal ad-
ministrative tribunals such as the Federal Trade
Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, etc." (11)
While the substituted bill was pending in the
Senate, Public Resolution No. 44 was enacted into law.
Dealing with the right of employees to organize and
bargain collectively was Section 7(a) of the National
Industrial Recovery Act; thus dealing with the same
subject as the Wagner Bill. However, the language of
Section 7(a) was considered so ambiguous that it misled
both employees and employers as to their rights under
the law. As a result of the ambiguity of Section 7(a),
Public or Joint Resolution No. 44 was passed by the
Senate as a temporary compromise "to effectuate further
the policy of the National Industrial Recovery Act". (13)
Briefly, Joint Resolution No. 44 gave the President
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authority to create a temporary hoard, directed to
investigate issues, facts, practices or activities
of employees or employers in any controversies a-
rising under Section 7(a) of the National Industrial
Recovery Act. This law was, in fact, a temporary
measure to "insure the right of employees to organize
and to select their representatives for the purpose
of collective bargaining as defined in Section 7(a)". (14)
Public Resolution No. 44 was made law June 19,
1934 and expired June 16, 1935 "or sooner". The
question may be asked "Why wasn’t the law merely
extended?" The answer is found in the power of the
Board as created by the Resolution. This temporary
measure made practically no contribution at all toward
supplying to the Board the power that was lacking.
Consequently, before the expiration of the law, the
Wagner Act was again introduced in the Senate February




THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
( Commonly known as the Wagner Act )
While the preceding chapter deals entirely with
the historical survey of the Wagner Act, this chapter
deals solely with a discussion of the Act.
The present bill was introduced in the Senate
February 21, 1935 and hearings before the Committee
on Education and Labor were held on the Act from
March through April. David I. Walsh of Massachusetts
acted as Chairman of the Committee and on May 2 , sub-
mitted a report recommending the passage of zhe Bill.
The National Labor Relations Act was enacted July
5, 1935.
In recorcm ending the adoption of the Act, Mr.
Walsh and the committee believed that ” the time has
come for a decision either to withdraw that promise
(1) or to implement it by effective legislation
In the committee’s judgment, the present bill is
a logical development of a philosophy and a consistent
policy manifest in many acts of Congress dealing over
a period of years with labor relations.” (2)
There are two general objectives of the bill:
(1) to promote Industrial Peace; (2) to "encourage.
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by developing the procedure of collective bargaining,
that equality of bargaining power which is a pre-
requisite to equality of opportunity and freedom of




No one can deny the fact that industrial peace
is lacking. Industrial strife is very costly.
During the period from 1915 through 1921 there were
on the average 3043 strikes per year, involving the
vacating of 1,745,000 jobs and the loss of 50,242,000
working days every 12 months. From 1922 through 1926,
the annual average totaled 1,050 strikes, 775,000
strikers, and 17,050,000 working days lost. From
1927 through 1931 the- yearly average for disputes was
763, for employees leaving their work 275,000, and
for days lost 5,665,000. In 1933, over 812,137
workers were drawn into strikes, and in 1934, the
number rose to 1,277,344. In this two-year period,
over 32,000,000 working days were lost because of
labor controversies. While exactitude is impossible,
reliable authority has it that over a long range of
time the losses due to strikes in this country has
amounted to at least $1,000,000,000 per year. And
no one can count the cost in bitterness of feeling,
in inef : iciency, and in permanent industrial dis-
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location. (4) It is not the purpose of the government
or the Act to attempt to remove all the causes of
labor disputes but "many of the most fertile sources
of industrial discontent can be segregated into a
single catagory susceptible to legislative treatment ."( 5)
The Act attempts to remove to a large proportion the
bitterest industrial outbreaks by giving definite
legal status to the procedure of collective bargaining
and establishing the machinery to facilitate it.
Modern Economic forces have left the individual
wage earner in an isolated position. The relative
position of the wage earner has been intensified by
technological forces and unless better economic ad-
justment is attained, a feeling of discontent will
grow to unknown degrees.
The National Labor Relations Act, as its history
reveals, is not completely new in scope and philosophy.
It really represents a reaffirmation of the principle
of collective bargaining and a resolve to set up a
permanent agency with full powers of enforcement. The
Act recognizes the interest of the public, labor, and
industry. It seeks to relieve the public of costly
labor disturbances through eliminating the deep-rooted
unrest brought on by- employers who set their wills
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agalnst the organization of their workers. "In
labor's behalf, it seeks to make it -unnecessary for
workers to undergo the hardships and dangers of
strikes in support of a right recognized for decades
by courts, by party platforms and by legislatures.
The prohibition of unfair labor practices imposes no
undue hardship on violators, and to industries
voluntarily complying with the lav/, it affords protec-
tion against the sweatshop tactics of unscrupulous
competitors . " (6) Preceding laws have dealt with
the subject of the Wagner Act but they have been weak
in certain respects. The two important laws that
have failed to prevent what they were designed to
prevent were the National Industrial Recovery Act and
Public Resolution No. 44.
The ambiguity of Section 7(a) of the National
Industrial Recovery Act (7) already has been mentioned.
The greater precision and certainty in the law of the
Wagner bill will clearly benefit both employers and
employees. Although Section 7(a) stated the principles
of collective bargaining, the excessive generality
hampered the administration and those who wished to
obey the law. Also, under the same Section, its ad-
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ministration was diffused among thirteen to fifteen
independent boards who had no power to enforce their
decisions. The enforcement of Section 7)a) was en-
trusted largely to the National Industrial Recovery
Administration.
Under Public Resolution No. 44, the Eoard, as
created by the law, had no powers and had to seek
enforcement through reference to the Department of
Justice. Furthermore, if the Government attempted
to conduct an election, it could be contested by
the employers in the courts which meant that there
was a possibility to delay the Government indefinitely.
Thus, the Wagner Act is an attempt to iron out
the weakness of preceding lav/s. It does not appear
to be ambiguous and general; it is independent of
other Government departments and administrative re-
sponsibility is entrusted in the hands of a few; it
has a definite procedure for the election of employee-
representation and enough power is vested in the
Board to make possible enforcement of its decisions. (8)
In Section I of the Act under the Title of
"Findings and Policy" the philosophy underlying this




In the first place, the legislation is based on
the assumption that "the denial by employers of the
right of employees to organize and the refusal by
employers to accept the procedure of collective
bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of in-
dustrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or
the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing
commerce" in various ways. (9) Even though the as-
sumption may be correct, it remains to be seen whether
equality of bargaining power between employees and
employers, articulated through a scheme of collective
bargaining, will substantially lessen industrial
strife." (10) I can see where collective bargaining
may reduce the number of industrial clashes but it
will not necessarily lessen the long-run damage
flowing from industrial strife.
Secondly, it is assumed that "the inequality of
bargaining power between employees who do not possess
full freedom of association or actual liberty of
contract, and employers who are organized in the cor-
porate or other forms of ownership association, sub-
stantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce,
and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions
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by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of
wage earners in industry, and by preventing the
stabilization of competitive wage rates and working
conditions within and between industries .”( 11 ) The
purpose is fair but it does not necessarily follow
that because a few of the unionized workers can
command higher wages, all unionized workers can
command higher wages. n It is doubtful whether the
equality of bargaining power between the employers
and employees will increase the total purchasing
power of employees in the form of wages." (12)
The third assumption of the Act is that collective
bargaining, in regard to wages, hours, and basic con-
ditions, will tend to increase the purchasing power
of employees through higher wages, foster, protect
and promote commerce between the states and lessen
industrial strife. The assumption seems fundamentally
sound, but as yet, we cannot conclude that what works
beneficially in a given group will also work in all
groups
.
While the three preceding assumptions are ex-
plicit, there are two other assumptions on which the
Act is based.
One is that employers enjoy a substantial advan-
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tage over the individual employees in the negotiations
of terms of employment, and that this advantage a-
rises out of the organization of employers in cor-
porate forms of ownership and out of numerous other
modern industrial conditions. (13)
The other is that we are living in a collectivist
era, that since capital is highly organized, labor
must be encouraged to organize; and "that the possi-
bility of returning to a regime of competition is
remote, if not entirely out of the question". (14)
No one will deny that the individual worker is
at a disadvantage to bargain with his employer but
it also seems true that the majority of employers do
not use their power to exploit their employees. That
class of employers is in the minority, it seems.
On such assumptions, a philosophy which is
debatable, the Wagner bill stands. On such theory,
whether it be logic and justice or political ex-
pediency, Congress asserts it to be the "policy of the
United States to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce,
and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when
they have occurred by encouraging the practice and
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procedure of collective bargaining, and by protecting
the exercise by workers of full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives
of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating
the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection." (15)
Definition of Terms:
A brief definition of terms as used in the Act
will be sufficient to illustrate their significance . (16
)
1. The term " employer" includes any person acting
in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly.
2. The term ^person" includes one or more
individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations,
legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy,
or receivers.
3. The term " employee" includes any employee,
and is not limited to the employees of a particular
employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise,
and includes any individual whose work ceased as a
consequence of, or in connection with, any current
labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice,




4. The term "representatives" includes any
individuals or labor organization.
5. The term "labor organization" means any
organization of any kind, or any agency or employee-
representation committee or plan, in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose, in
v/hole or in part, of dealing with employers concern-
ing grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment, or conditions of work.
6. The term "commerce" means trade, traffic,
commerce, transportation, or communication among the
several states, any territory of the United States.
7. The term "affecting commerce" means in
commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the
free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to
lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing com-
merce or the free flow of commerce.
8. The term "labor dispute" includes any
controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions
of employment, or concerning the association or re-
presentation of persons in negotiating, fixing, main-
aining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of employment regardless of whether the




Rights of Employe e s Unfair L abor Practice:
Section 7 of the Wagner Act declares the rights
of employees. They "shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organi-
zations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and engage in concerted
activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection". In reference to
the rights of employees, it was argued by some re-
presentatives of employers, when the Act was being
considered, that this legislation need not be enacted
because labor already enjoyed such rights. In actual
practice, however, it is doubtful whether labor does
enjoy 3uch rights. Prior to section 7(a) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act, (17) employers, in
general, did not recognize these rights while the
courts paid little attention to them. Furthermore,
the Government had established few remedies for their
violation. "The Wagner Act now purports to make
these rights dynamic by defining violations of them,
and by creating legal machinery to prevent the com-
mission of such violations". (18)
In reference to the unfair labor practices, they
are strictly limited to the ones enumerated in the
Act. In this respect, they are better defined and
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inore definite than preceding laws. The Act enumerates
four uniform Labor Practices.
The first unfair labor practice has to do with
the interference, restraint, or coercion of the em-
ployees by the employer; "it shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain
or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7." (19)
It is interesting to note how one author (20)
interprets this first unfair labor practice. He
thinks it is a comprehensive, broad prohibition upon
the employer. The language of this prohibition, using
three terms in ascending severity, is designed to
protect workers in their rights against any employer's
interference, whether mild or coercive, direct or in-
direct. This unfair labor practice forbids employers
to interfere with the right of workers to engage in
collective bargaining through their representatives.
It prohibits the employer from offering inducement
with a view of influencing the workmen or representa-
tives in the exercise of their rights under the Act.
The first unfair labor practice makes it impossible
for an employer to close his business or change locality
in order to violate the rights or escape his obligations
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he will be guilty if the Board can prove that he
intentionally violated this Section of the Act.
The employer is even guilty of this unfair labor
practice if he gives information which is deliberate
and wilful misrepresentation; he must be careful as
to the kind of information he gives his employees.
The Board will experience many difficulties attempt-
ing to get exact information from the employers and
employees concerning a situation. It is evident
that the Board is in a very delicate position and
must use the greatest amount of prudence.
The second unfair labor practice deals with
employer-sponsored labor organizations. It forbids
an employer n to dominate or interfere with the
formation or administration of any labor organization
or contribute financial or other support to it" .(21)
The purpose of this section is to cripple, and in
time destroy, existing company unions and employee-
representation plans and to render very difficult the
organization of new ones. A strict enforcement of
this section of the Act will undoubtedly accomplish
the objectives. There is little doubt from the
language that the Labor Board will outlaw employer-
dominated unions, and employee-representation plans
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falling under its jurisdictions; "Yellow dog" (22)
contracts will be (or should be) nullified; in
brief, the law attempts to make it illegal for em-
ployers to influence, for their benefit, their
employees. The fallacy underlying the second un-
fair labor practice is the assumption that all
company-unions and employee-representation plans
are intrinsically bad; the assumption is, of course,
unjustifiable. It is also unjustifiable to assume
that a labor organization of the type represented by
the American Federation of Labor can be the solution
to industrial strife as the section apparently as-
sumes.' It seems to be a matter of opinion which view
one should take.
Section 8 (3) of the Act declares it to be
"unfair labor practice for an employer to use
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure or em-
ployment, or any term or condition of employment, or
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization" (23). The fault in this third unfair
labor practice lies in the exact meaning of the word
"discrimination". As used in the Act, it may be in-
terpreted to mean petty discriminations to outrageous
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dismissals . One illustration of discrimination is
indicated by an employer who is willing to pay non-
union men for time lost during a strike but will
not pay union men. Another form of discrimination
is found in the increases in wages and promotions.
The most com on form of discrimination is the dis-
missal of an employee because of his union membership.
Although the third unfair labor practice seem
beneficial to all, the fact is that it infringes up-
on the right of employers to hire, promote and dis-
miss workers.
The fourth unfair labor practice, (Section 8(4)
of the Act), which is self-explanatory, states that
"it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an
employee because he has filed charges or given
testimony under this Act". (24)
Section 8 (5), giving the fifth and final unfair
labor practice, has to do with an employer's refusal
to bargain collectively. "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collect-
ively v/ith the representatives of a majority of his
workers within a unit appropriate for collective
bargaining". (25) The purpose of this provision is
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intended to induce or compel employers to make col-
lective agreements with, their employees. The em-
ployer is guilty if he refuses to receive employee-
representatives at a reasonable time for purposes
of collective bargaining. If he does receive them
he can match the demands of the employees, with
counter-proposals. In such a case, the Board will
have to determine the meaning of the term "Bargain".
In brief, "bargaining is the process of negotiation
while, if persisted long enough, will produce some
kind of an agreement between the parties". (26) And
if the employees -employer do not come to an agreement
will the Government exert pressure upon the employer
to make concessions? If it does, then the employer
would be a victim of a "unilateral compulsory arbitra-
tion" (27). The answer seems to lie in the power and
administration of the National Labor Relations Board.
This fifth unfair labor practice is perhaps
the major test of the administration of the Board.
Thus, we have noted the unfair labor practices
as specified by the Wagner Act. They are intended,
in the first place, "to protect employees in their
right to organize for lawful purposes, including that
of collective bargaining, against the interference of
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employers of 1 .bor or their agents". (£8) In the
second place, they are intended to induce or force
collective agreements between employer and his em-
ployees with respect to "rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment and other working conditions".
Representations and Elections:
In reference to the representatives of the
employees and the election of their representatives,
the purpose of the Act is to give the employees
total freedom of choice in the matter. The Act
gives the employees exclusive right, and since the
employer has no legal concern, he is not expected
to interfere. Furthermore, the employer must receive
the representatives of his employees once they are
elected, and cannot refuse them because of personal
objections.
Section 9(a) of the Act sets forth what is
known as the "majority rule" of selecting represen-
tatives. This section of the Act provides that
"representatives designated or selected for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining by the majority of the
employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes.
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shall be the exclusive representatives of all
of all the employees in > such unit for the purpose of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions
of employment”
. (29) In his report to the Senate,
(30) Hon. David I. Walsh brings out the point that
by long experience, the majority rule has been dis-
covered best for both employees and employers. It
is well known that the workers have found it im-
possible to approach their employers in a friendly
manner if they remained divided among themselves.
The employers have also found it conducive to har-
monious labor relations to negotiate with representa-
tives chosen by the majority than with "numerous war-
ring fractions". However, it must not be implied
that the minority is not to be heard; the voice of
the minority must be heard in collective negotiations.
The employers have objected to this feature of
the Act principally because they were afraid of the
collective strength of organized labor. There is,
I think, a temptation for organized labor to step into
the picture; the Act is a strong ally of organized
labor. However, it is also true that the employers
object to the majority rule because they wish to be
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their own labor leaders and because they are as dis-
trustful of labor leaders as the average workman is
of his employer. It is a beautiful case of "mixed-
up emotional states, repressed jealousy and mutual
distrust often founded on good grounds on both
sides." (31)
In the matter of receiving representatives,
obviously, the employer is justified in refusing to
bargain with them if they speak for a selected group
of the total. Consequently, it is in the interest
of the employer and employees to make certain
two points before receiving representatives. In the
first place, the employer is entitled to know if the
alleged representatives represent the appropriate
unit which the law requires him to recognize for col-
lective bargaining. Secondly, he is entitled to know
with certainty that the representatives really have
authority to speak for a majority of the employees.
To settle any controversy that may arise in this
connection. Section 9(c) of the Act declares that
"whenever a question affecting commerce arises con-
cerning the representatives of the employees, the
Board has power to investigate such controversy and
certify to the parties, in writing, the name or names
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of the representatives that have been designated or
selected” (32) by the majority to represent them in
bargaining collectively.
Investigating such controversies, hearings will
revolve about several issues:
In the first place, the Board will have to seek
enough information as to whether the controversy
concerning representation "affects commerce".
In the second place, the Board will have to
ascertain if the group of workers is an appropriate
unit for purposes of collective bargaining.
In the third place, the Board will have to look
into the circumstances of each controversy with a
view of determining whether a secret poll of the em-
ployees is necessary and appropriate in its attempt
to settle the controversy. It is a question of e-
vidence which is sometimes difficult to acquire.
In the fourth place, the Board, in conducting
the hearing to approve the representatives, will
have to decide as to the eligible persons for repre-
sentatives. On the basis of such information, the
Board will "certify to the parties, in writing, the




It is interesting to note the effect of Section
9(c) of the Act from the point of view of the em-
ployees and employers. From the point of view of the
employer, the fact that an election is scheduled and
publicly announced in advance creates a situation un-
favorable to him and his business. It produces the
Impression both to employees and to the public that
the employer is In some manner in defiance of the Act.
Moreover, the electioneering which goes on during the
interval tends to demoralize his plant and to Inter-
fere with the normal operations of his business.
From the viewpoint of the individual employees,
the fact that an election is publicly announced in
advance is also unfortunate. During the interval it
exposes employees to a concentrated attack on them
and their families by representatives of organized
groups. This is particularly unfortunate when it
is remembered that individual employees, who may not
be interested in joining a union, have no means of
protecting themselves against such attacks. On the
contrary, in the small shops it is very often the
case where many workmen tell organizers” that they
want to join the Union but that their boss won’t let
them. Then they tell 'the employer that they really
hate the Union but do not dare to say so, and beg him
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to get them off. If the employer
’
goes hack on them,'
then they vote for a strike to get even v/ith the
employer for not protecting them from the Union.” (33)
In view of these circumstances, the Board should
make a careful study of other methods of polling em-
ployees with a view of minimizing the embarrassment





The National Labor Relations Board:
In order to make the law effective, the Act
created a National Labor Relations Board. It is
the third attempt of the present (Roosevelt) ad-
ministration "to establish a labor tribunal to
assist capital and labor in making their adjustment
to a regim 3 of collective bargaining which the ad-
ministration wisely or unwisely envisages". (35)
President Roosevelt created a National Labor
Board under Title I of the National Industrial Re-
covery Act, August 5, 1933. It was created to de-
cide promptly on any dispute that would arise from
the interpretation or application of the President’s
Re-employment Agreement. On December 16, 1933, the
same Board was continued to adjust labor disputes
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arising under the codes of fair competition and those
arising out of re-employment agreement. On February
1, 1934, the Board was authorized to conduct an e-
lection and hear complaints against employers who
violated their obligation under Section 7(a) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act. This first Eoard
continued to function most ineffectively until June
30, 1934.
The second attempt started on June 30, 1934
when the President, under Public Resolution No. 44,
created the National Labor Adjustment Board. When
the Supreme Court decided against Section 3 of the
National Industrial Recovery Act, the Board became
helpless because Section 7(a) of the same act de-
pended on Section 3. (36) However, even before
the count decided, the Board was as ineffective and
unsuccessful in securing compliance with its decisions
as the National Labor Board.
The third attempt started July 5, 1935 when the
President signed the National Labor Relations Act
commonly known as the Wagner Act. The Act establishes
a strong labor tribunal, quasi- judicial in character.
As to its organization, the Board created by the
Wagner Act is composed of three members appointed by
.\
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the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
The President is empowered to "remove upon notice,
for neglect of duty or malfeasance but for no other
cause." One of the three members is designated as
chairman of the Board. Two members constitute a
quorum and have authority to act as the Board. (37)
The Board is created as an independent agency
of the Government. The preceding boards, we recall,
were a part of the Department of Labor. Presenting
his Bill before the Senate, Senator Wagner stated,
"I cannot urge too strongly that the National Labor
Relations Board should be maintained as an independent
agency of the Government. Collective Bargaining
rights should be centered in one supreme board,
instead of scattered among a number of boards.
There is no more reason why the Board should be con-
nected with the Department of Labor than why the
Federal Trade Commission should be attached to the
Department of Commerce. For years lawyers and eco-
nomists have pleaded for a dignified administrative
tribunal, detached from any particular administration
that happens to be in power, and entitled to deal
quasi- judicially with issues with which the courts
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have neither the time nor the special facilities to
cope. With such a tribunal in the offering, its
integrity should be preserved.” (33)
Obviously, the Department of Labor objected to
the creation of a Board as an independent agency.
In the preceding attempts, the Board was under the
jurisdiction of the Department of Labor. In pre-
senting her objection on the point to the Senate,
Miss Perkins, our present Secretary of Labor, stated:
(39) nMore over, I think we have established the
principle that these Boards should be quasi- judicial
and not conciliation Boards I make one sug-
gestion. I believe this board should be definitely
located within the Department of Labor. An examina-
tion of the experience of other agencies of the
Government leads me definitely to this conclusion.
In the first place, I think it is a mistake to create
any further independent agencies in the Government,
if it can be avoided. The danger of too many inde-
pendent agencies in Government, of setting up an
executive and administrative system, is so large and
complicated that no President can really know what ih e
development is .1 think another reason why it
is unwise to establish this Board as an independent
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agency, is not only the likelihood of duplication
of conciliation activity, but also of duplication
of other activities now carried on in the Department
of Labor; particularly statistical and research
work. I think there is bound to be an unnecessary
duplication of that activity if it is an independent
agency Moreover, it is highly important
that all matters which relate to labor problems
should be retained within the framework and structure
of the Department of Labor."
However, Mr. Francis Biddle, Chairman of the
National Labor Relations Board as created by Public
Resolution No. 44,makes the same point quite explicit.
"In my judgment, establishing the Board as an inde-
pendent agency in the executive branch of the
Government, is one of the most vital provisions of
the bill. I wish to say also that all my observations
are made from the long-range point of view. The value
and success of any quasi- judicial Government board
dealing with labor relations lies first and foremost
in its independence and impartiality. After all,
although the bill deals with the rights of labor, for
the success of the machinery contemplated by the Act,
it must in the long run have the confidence of in-
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dustry and of the public at large. It seems to us
that if the employees and agents of the National
Board and any regional boards set up by it are ap-
pointed subject to the approval of the Secretary
of Labor and are a part of the Department of Labor,
ana the Board is subject to the budgetary control
of the Department, the machinery cannot be considered
either impartial or independent. In view of this
fact, it is inconsistent with such impartiality and
independence to attach the Board to any department in
the executive branch of the government, and parti-
cularly to a department whose function, in fact and
in the public view, is to look after the interest of
labor We conclude that every consideration
of congressional precedent in like cases, of ef-
ficiency, of giving the Board an assured independence
in its judicial and administrative -work, requires
that the Board be established as an independent a-
gency in the Executive branch of the Government, as
provided in the bill before your committee. To
call the Board Independent is not in fact to make it
independent if it is within the Department of Labor
and subject to the direct control of the Secretary of
Labor both as to the appointment of its personnel and
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as to the control of its expenses." (40)
It was only after much debating that Congress
finally created the Board as an independent agency
of the Government
.
Outside of establishing the principal office
in Washington, the Board is allowed (Section 4 of the
Act) to establish or utilize regional or local agen-
cies, "and utilize such voluntary and uncompensated
services as may from time to time be needed." Be-
cause such regional or local agencies rendered
valuable service under the preceding boards, the new
Board has continued to divide the nation into regions
and placing at the head of each district a regional
director. Many now feel, however, that it is
doubtful if the Government can muster sufficient
uncompensated service for the effective operation of
regional boards. It seems probable that although
regional boards may be maintained, "one may safely
predict that the Board will increasingly rely upon
regional directors and upon examiners sent out from
Washington to carry on the field work which will be
necessary in the administration of the law." (41)
Jurisdiction of the Labor Board:
The Wagner Act limits the jurisdiction of the
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Board to two types of labor controversies. The
first (42) gives the Board power to investigate
controversies concerning the representation of
employees for purposes of collective bargaining.
The second (43) empowers the Board to prevent any
person from engaging in any of the listed unfair
labor practices
.
(44) Even over these two classes
of controversies, the Board’s jurisdiction extends
only to those disputes which arise "in commerce” or
which "affect commerce".
The Act does not give to the Board any authority
to engage in mediation, conciliation or arbitration;
these activities are left entirely to the Department
of Labor.
It Is also significant to know that the Board
has no power to do research work in the field of in-
dustrial relations; Section 4 of the Act states
clearly that if the Board requires any statistical
assistance, it must go to the Department of Labor
for it.
Finally, the Board has no jurisdiction over
disputes arising between competing unions or labor
organizations. "Viewed generally, the Board is an
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adrainistrat ive agency, possessing legislative and
judicial powers in addition to its administrative
functions." (45)
Section 10 of the Act explains the procedure
of the Board to prevent unfair labor practices. It
states that "whenever it is charged that an employer
has engaged or is engaging in any unfair labor practice
the Board shall have the power to issue and cause to
be served upon the employer, a complaint setting forth
the charges and notifying the employer that a hearing
on the complaint will be conducted at a designated
place, at a time not less than five days after the
service of the complaint". (46) Of course, any com-
plaint can be amended by the Board at any time prior
to the issuance of the order. The employer has a
right to file an answer to the complaint but is not
required to do so. He may also appear in person or
through an agent and give testimony in his behalf and
he may be allowed to introduce witnesses.
When the testimony is available, it is reduced
in writing and filed with the Board. The Board then
proceeds to make recommendations on the basis of the
evidence it has. "If upon the testimony taken the
Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in
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the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any
such labor practice, then the Board shall state its
findings of fact and issue and cause to be served
on such person an order requiring him to ''cease and
desist" from such unfair labor practice, and to take
such affirmative action, including reinstatement of
employees with or without back pay, as will effect-
uate the policies of this Act." (47)
If the Board, on the other hand, finds that the
person complained of is not guilty of the charges,
the Board issues an order dismissing the complaint.
The Act carries the matter further. In order
to make certain that the person getting a "cease
and desist" order from the Board is being treated
legally right, the statute makes adequate provision
for a judicial review of the Board’s orders in re-
spect to the unfair labor practices. Thus, the
final orders to be obeyed by the respondent of the
complaint are issued from a federal court of juris-
diction and not from the Labor Board.
Controversies reach the courts in one of two
ways. In the first place, if a person fails to
comply with the order of the Board, the latter may
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petition a federal court for the enforcement of its
order. In the second place, the person ruled against
may ask the federal courts to modify or set aside the
order of the Board.
After having reviewed the record of the contro-
versy and heard arguments, the court has the power
to grant any relief as it deems just and proper.
Investigatory Powers of the Board :
The Act also provides, in order to facilitate
the efforts of the Board in getting the facts of a
controversy, certain specific investigatory powers.
The Act provides that the Board or any of its de-
signated agency "shall at all reasonable times have
access to, for the purpose of examination, and the
right to copy any evidence of any person being in-
vestigated or proceeded against that relates to any
matter under investigation or in question." Further-
more, any member of the Board has the "power to issue
subpenas requiring the attendance and testimony of
witnesses and the production of any evidence that re-
lates to any matter under investigation or in question,
before the Board, its members, agent, or agency con-
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ducting the hearing or investigation'*. (43)
A member of the Board or one designated by the
Board has the power to administer oaths, affirmations,
examine witnesses, and receive evidence.
If any person, subject to the jurisdiction of
the Board fails to appear when called and refuses to
produce evidence as required by the subpena, the
Board has the right to apply to the federal court for
an order requiring the witness to appear or produce
evidence. If the witness disobeys the court order,
he is subject to punishment for contempt of court.
However, the Board, using the investigatory
power vested in it by the Act, is limited only to
those functions specified in Section 9 and 10 of
the Act. (49)
The Act declares two important limitations.
The first provides that "nothing in the Act shall
be construed so as to interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike". The second
provides that if any part of the Act is held invalid,
the remainder of the Act shall not be affected by such
a ruling. (50)
In concluding this chapter, it is interesting to
note the comparison of the preceding Boards with the
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one established by the Wagner Act.
The old Labor Board was pathetically ineffective
in securing compliance with its recommendations and
decisions; as a matter of fact, it possessed no power
to secure compliance. To help it fail, the Department
of Justice evinced no enthusiasm to take action against
those employers who chose to ignore the decision of
the Board.
However, in creating the new Board, Congress
has vested in it ample power to secure compliance.
If the Board now fails to secure compliance, it certainly
will not be because of lack of power. The Board has
adequate sanctions for the enforcement of the law.
In securing evidence concerning labor contro-
versies, the new Labor Board is so much better
equipped than the old. It has the power to require
persons to appear before the Board or to produce needed
evidence and, if a person fails to do so, the Board
can force him to abide by securing an order from the
federal courts which would make that person, if he
continued to disobey, liable to the court for contempt.
The new Board has the power to administer "oaths
or affirmations to witnesses in getting facts. Any

--48-
person who swears falsely before the Board is sub-
ject to severe punishment for the criminal offense
of perjury". (51)
Much of the success of the Board will depend
on the constitutionality of the Act. It has not as
yet been tried in the Supreme Court and the present
administration is not particularly enthusiastic to
have the Act tried before the Supreme Court of the
United States. But until the Act is put to a trial
for its constitutionality, we can conclude that the
Labor Board created by the Act has all the power
needed to secure compliance with its orders. And
if its administration breaks down, it will not be
because the Board lacks power, but because Congress




HEARINGS ON THE WAGNER BILL BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR
I don’t suppose anything has ever been suggested,
or ever will be suggested which has not aroused, or
will not arouse three types of human beings.
The first type is the pessimist who always sees
the disadvantages of things, who hates to change from
the old order to the new and who is ever-ready to
present arguments to oppose such things. Whether he
is led by selfish, personal reasons, for social bene-
fit or for fear of the effects of such changes is
rather difficult to say. However, I rather have a
feeling that selfish, personal reasons and fear of
the effects underlie his arguments.
The second type is the "one who doesn’t give a
damn". It is the type of a person who is not in-
terested in his environment, knows not what new changes
are taking place and cares less. We could name such
a person, "a neutral person"; regardless of his name,
this type of a person is satisfied to live life as it
comes, day-in and day-out, believing that world progress
is vested entirely in a Supreme Power. World progress,
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especially social progress, is hardly a result of
this type of a person.
The third type is the optimist who sees the
advantage of new things and new ideas, foresees their
potentialities from the light of social benefit as
well as personal. It is this type that fosters new
i
ideas and is ready to argue in their favor. The
United States ov r©s Its great advance to world
dominance to the optimist. The American Revolution
would never have been fought and won had it not been
for this type of persons. The same is true of the
Civil War and the freedom of slaves.' Need we say
any more to show that this type is really and truly
the leader in political, economic, social, educational
and industrial advancement?
In the field of labor, we can apply the same
principles. The Labor Act under discussion, regard-
less of method, is an endeavor on the part of the
Government to bring about a better relationship between
employers and employees. The purpose is not to bet-
ter the employees at the expense of the employers; or
vice-versa; and yet, the Act, in purpose and not
method, has its pessimists and neutral persons as well
as its optimists.

The purpose of this chapter, then, is to present
the arguments in support of and in opposition to the
Wagner Act. The reader will note that the arguments
herein presented are from the viewpoint of several
fields of endeavor. I have taken much care to pre-
sent the arguments from the point of view of educators
labor organizations, politicians, business men, and
even religious organizations.
Dean Lloyd K. Garrison, Dean of the Law School
of the University of Wisconsin (1), presents interest-
ing arguments in support of the Wagner Act. He
endorses the Act on three bases. First, as a safety
measure because he regards organized labor in this
country as the chief bulwark against communism and
other revolutionary movements. Second, as an econo-
mic measure because as costs decrease and profits in-
crease, it is absolutely essential that the level of
wages should be increased to make possible the neces-
sary purchasing power of the mass; and the best method
to maintain and increase the purchasing power of the
mass is by means of collective bargaining. His third
argument in support of the bill is "a matter of simple
justice. The economic power of employers, particular
ly of large industries, completely overshadows the e-
conomic powers of the workers unless the latter are

organized. It seems to me utterly unfair and un-
just for employers to prevent the free organization
of their workers by the various forms of discrimina-
tion which have been prevalent in this country." (la)
One of the major arguments presented against
the Wagner Act is directed against the majority rule
of electing representatives. Dean Garrison discusses
the point at length. He points out the fact that it
is evident that the employers who oppose the rule
merely do so because they v/ant to avoid doing any
collective bargaining, and they will succeed as long
as they can keep their employees diffused and not
organized.
Another argument to oppose the Wagner Act is
that it tends to abolish the company unions. Dean
Garrison points out that the company union is not
only an instrument of the employer in most instances
but also that no "company union, however set up, can
possibly be effective as a collective bargaining a-
gency for the very simple reason that the represen-
tatives of the company union are themselves employees,
who are subject to being fired at any moment, who are




hope to curry favor with their employer by being
polite ancl courteous, and not bringing up disagreeable
matters. Furthermore, the company union representa-
tives, being simply employees within the plant, have
no means of knowing what the conditions of the in-
dustry are, what other plants are paying, what the
wage level of the industry is, and they simply have
not the information necessary to make them competent
representatives of the men Finally, with the
company union set-up, it is impossible ever to con-
ceive of reaching industry-wide agreements, because
each plant is treated as a thing in itself, and the
talks go on within the plant without the least re-
ference to the other units in the industry. Per-
sonally, it would seem to me altogether very
desirable, if it could be done, to legislate the
company unions altogether out of existence, regard-
less of whether they are dominated by the employer,
or set up by the employer, or financed by him, be-
cause I think we shall make no progress under them
whatsoever.” (lb)
Referring to the matter of the independence of
the Board as set-up by the Wagner Act, the Dean thinks
the Board is best as an independent agency, and the
general public should know about its independency;
"the supremacy of the Board is very important for

without it, nothing but confusion can result." (lc)
Professor H. A. Millis (2), Head of the Depart-
ment of Economics at the University of Chicago, gives
arguments to support the Wagner Act. He maintains that
the Act is a correct step toward creating a better
industrial relationship. The Act from his point of
view, is fundamentally sound because
l/ the great majority of wage-earners are
employed under such conditions that they must act in
concert with reference to wage scales, hours and
working conditions if they are to have a reasonably
effective voice as to the terms on which they shall
work;
2/ the average employer, however appreciative
he may be of the values of good employment conditions
and the needs of his workers, is under the necessity
of reducing costs because of the many saving, chiseling
practices of his less socially minded competitors;
3/ a measure of control of wages is necessary
if the needed relationship between consuming power
and production is to be maintained, and general in-
stability checked;
4/ if and when collective bargaining is definite-
ly free from undue militancy, as it can be when wise
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management and good labor leadership are brought into
cooperation, special problems connected with collective
bargaining clear up and there are opportunities for
gain to all parties.
Mr. Harold Shapiro, Professor of administrative
law at the New York Law School (3) , gives a very in-
teresting angle in favor of the Act. He states that
regardless of what might motivate an employer to
favor labor union regulation, it is his belief that
labor should be regulated for its own good, for the
perpetuation of the union-labor idea, for the pro-
tection of the large number of non-union of employees
who will be brought into unions inevitably under the
provisions of the Wagner bill, and for the protection
of the general public which suffers whenever there is
maladjustment in industry. Certain it is that if
labor unions were subject to government supervision,
it would result in happier days for the rank and file
of labor unions and the employers alike. "I am not
talking of imposing a code upon labor. I am asking
that labor be accorded the same privilege of present-
ing its own code at least to the extent of giving
labor the op ortunity of setting forth what in its
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mind are the greatest abuses within labor organiza-
tions, so that a house cleaning might be effected
comparable to what is happening in bar associations,
in various other professional groups and throughout
the length and breadth of the land for the protection
of large groups of so-called "forgotten men". He
expresses his further contention that the day has
come when the union worker, who too frequently has
been silent because of fear to speak, because of the
fact that persons in union offices have perpetuated
themselves, and without the same restraint which is
required of other groups, shall be given this "Magna
Gharta of Labor" which should be recognized and pro-
tected by the Government in the efforts of employees
as members of a union to survive in what may be e-
ventually the only source of employment, or the only
means to employment that may be available to such
union members.
From the lips of John L. Lewis (4) come several
reasons why he is in support of the Wagner Act. In
this thesis, we need to cite the most important reasons
he points out that the "right of labor to collectively
bargain for wages and hours of labor has double justifi
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cation. It is fundamentally just in that it gives
to labor an approach to equality with industrial
management, and it should result in a fair distri-
bution of the national income.” (4a) He advances
the belief that company unions are really the re-
sult of fear on the part of workmen that they might
lose their jobs unless they accept such organizations.
Mr. Lewis points out that there is also a question of
confidence involved. He continues: "With the elimi-
nation of confidence, it is obvious to anyone that
any arrangement involving human relations, will not
function. Confidence is necessary from every stand-
point, and when the confidence of the workers is de-
stroyed by what seems to be a studied attempt to
take away from them rights which they should have, it
is no longer necessary to wonder why the workers of
this country lose confidence in some of the efforts
of the Government to enlarge their opportunities and
create for them equality in bargaining power and op-
portunity.” (4b) The policy of the Wagner bill Is
to relieve them of this fear and to restore confidence.
Let us cite the views of a business man. (5) "I
firmly believe that the organization of workers under
the American Federation of Labor plan leads to better
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wages, fewer hours, and improved working conditions;
that vast benefits can accrue to the employer, that
it develops character, fosters, justice and tolerance,
and makes for better economic conditions in the
Nation. My experience has convinced me that organized
labor is a great constructive force in the betterment
of economic growth, as applied to industrial relations.
There is no question but what the application of this
philosophy has made consistently for the betterment
of conditions of employment and progress of my com-
pany. Having witnessed at first hand the benefits
that accrue to all through collective bargaining, I
have become thoroughly imbued with that principle,
and have operated my plant on a strictly union-shop
basis and have never once regretted my contracts with
my employees. We have found that not only the work-
ers in our plant have been willing to live up to
their agreements but the officials of the interna-
tional union as well have always been more than anxious
that agreements were not violated and that the rank and
file live up to their contracts. We feel that this
has been a very splendid arrangement for us as well as
for the men. It has prevented agitation from the out-
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side and radical agitation from the inside. It has
prevented the management being harrassed by workers
on trivial matters. Contacts with the workers have
always been through their shop committees. On some
occasions some small groups in our plant would feel
that they were not receiving in exact proportion
with what others were, but in every instance it was
the union who brought to their attention the fact
that they had a signed agreement with our company,
and all disputes were quickly settled, causing us
no inconvenience whatever. During all these
years I have taken the position that it is far bet-
ter to have signed agreements with labor than to
have constant controversy with them. In fact, so
great is my belief that I have constantly championed
the cause of labor. This has led to many discus-
sions with other employers, and these discussions
have convinced that more misinformation has been
spread upon this subject than upon any other. I
refer to misinformation regarding the iniquities of
the producer in industry. I have known many busi-
ness men, who, while they appeared to be reasonably
fair in most matters, when discussing the subject of
organized labor seemed to lose all sense of propor-
tion and made exaggerated statements about organized
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labor which were without any foundation of truth.
[i
They have been quick to damn and condemn officials
of organized labor, assuming, and in most cases
without first-hand knowledge, that these leaders
were grafters, that they were men who mulct the
members of their unions. I ha> e always known the
care with which the rank and file of organized
labor select their officials. If our country is
to effectuate recovery and again reach a place
whetfe labor can buy back the products it produces,
we must see to it that labor shall have some voice
in the determination of conditions under which
they work and wages which they are to receive. I
am fully convinced that the labor of an individual
is not a commodity or an article of commerce to
be bartered and bargained for. The worker should
be given the right to organize. Organized labor
symbolized by the American Federation of Labor
stands squarely behind the worker and the fair
employer. We believe in and heartily endorse
their principles."
Dr. Goldstein, a rabbi(6), supports
the bill on the following basis:
In the first place, it will legalize and make part
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of the lav/ of the land the right of labor to organize
and to bargain collectively through representatives
of its own choosing; in the second place, it will
outlaw unfair practices on the part of employers,
practices that are designed to weaken and destroy the
labor movement in America. Furthermore, wages are
increased, hours are shortened, and working conditions
are improved only as the power of the workers increases
through organization. The right to organize, to
bargain collectively with the employer is a right that
must be protected by law through some agency as the
Wagner bill creates. The Nation will recover from
this economic collapse only to the extent that the
mass of the people recover their purchasing power,
and purchasing power can come only through an in-
crease in wages. The increase in wages in turn will
come only as a result of the right of workers to
organize and to enforce their demands upon the em-
ployers and employers’ associations.
Mr. Madden, present chairman of the Board (7),
regards the Wagner Act as a recognition of the right
of employees to join their forces in what they con-
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ceive to be their common cause and to authorize one
or more representatives to speak for them as a
group; a recognition that is perfectly lav/ful for
such a group to apply to their industrial relations;
the principle of representation upon which our A-
merican State and National Government are founded.
In concluding the arguments supporting the
National Labor Relations Act, it is well, I think, to
present those of the author of the bill. Senator
Robert F. Wagner. (8) Briefly, Senator Wagner is
not wholly opposed to the company unions. "It (the
company union) has improved personal relations of em-
ployer-employees, it has improved group welfare ac-
tivities and it has helped to improve discipline
and other matters which may be handled on a local
basis. But it has not helped that national status
of employees." The bill is an endeavor to settle a
major question which involves self-expression and
democracy on the part of the employees; it is an at-
tempt to eliminate employers’ domination of the em-
ployees; it is an attempt to make it legal to forbid
an employer to influence any organization which deals
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with labor problems such as hours, wages, grievances,
and so forth. Senator Wagner concludes by stating,
"I am sure that employers as well as employees will
favor the measure. It is merely another step to-
ward Social Justice.’1
So much for the arguments in support of the Act;
let us now consider arguments in opposition to the
Act.
Mr. W . Gibson Carey, Jr., a business rnan,(9)
has made some statements against the Wagner Act. In
the first place, he feels that the relationship be-
tween labor and management are from every practical
standpoint best handled locally on the ground that
conditions vary in different localities. In answer
to one of the assumptions on which the Wagner bill
is based; namely that the employers exploit the em-
ployees, Mr. Carey points out the fact that the as-
sumption is false. "Fair management is labor’s best
friend. Despite what has been said so many times, there
is in well-run American business a unity of purpose
extending from the president of a company to the yard
laborer. In the long run it is my belief that the
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utmost for the company and for the employees is at-
tained when managements deal either directly with their
men or through industrial councils, or company unions.
My belief, and I think nearly all business men today
agree, is that high wages are desirable from a great
many viewpoints, but it must always be remembered
that a company cannot be constructive either to the
community at large or to its employees unless over
the long-run the outgo is less than the income.
The changing status of labor in the United States in
the last hundred years has been tremendous. The
standard of living has improved four-fold. The hours
of labor have been decreased tremendously. These
trends must in any fair man’s mind be given great
weight, since they show that without the Wagner Labor
Relations bill really immense strides have been made
by industrial employees." (9a) But Mr. Carey, or any
other industrialist for that matter, does not sug-
gest the horrible idea that the gains of industrial
labor and the strides made by industry may have been
at the expense of the farmer and the white-collar group.
In answer to the argument against company unions,
Mr. Carey states: "My point is that any trend toward
the abolition of FAIR company unions or individual
relationship between employees and employers is decidedly
not in the public interest nor in the interest of the
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employees themselves” (9b) Mr. Carey continues to
point out that there may be company unions which are
dominated by the employers, but the menace of ” em-
ployee-domination is equally as great”. He concludes:
M I do maintain that in a well-run industrial insti-
tution, where men are receiving fair pay considering
the general conditions in the industry and in the
business in question, there is no reason why there
should be placed on the men the added cost of union
dues. I make the plea that decent employers who are,
in my opinion, greatly in the majority both in numbers
and in the numbers of their employees, should not be
penalized because of the action of such unscrupulous
employers as there may be. I say without qualifica-
tion that employers who are not giving their men a
thoroughly square deal considering the condition of
their business should be curbed. It is evident that
unfair treatment of employees is almost as disastrous
to a fair competitor as it is to the employees who
are being injured." (9c)
Mr. McAuliffe views his oppositions to the
Wagner Act from the point of view of labor (10). His
first argument is that he does not believe the Act
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can be administered successfully under any form of
government short of a military dictatorship. For his
second argument, Mr. McAuliffe points out that no law
which tries to prescribe uniform habits for 120,000,000
persons can ever be practical. The failure of the
Prohibition Act and the National Industrial Recovery
Act are outstanding examples of such recent endeavors.
(10a) He contends further that the measure is one-
sided, "intended to extend the privileges of labor
without attaching any corresponding degree of re-
sponsibility. Labor can appeal to the law for redress,
and while the findings of the Labor Board are made
mandatory on the employers, the employees cannot be
compelled to accept same". Another common weakness
of the Act lies in the fact that the consumer of the
product of the mill, factory, or mine subject to the
law, he who pays the bills, is accorded no rights to-
ward a continuing supply of the material or product
involved in the controversy; "the repudiation of a
legal award, sanctioned under the Act, damaging not
alone the employer but the consumer, who had no place
in the proceedings." (10b) "In conclusion, no law
can be successfully enforced that attempts to put
all labor, even in one line of service, on the same
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earning basis. There are too many small industries
to warrant belief in success. Again I will venture
the opinion that of the unemployed that exist today,
not less than one -fourth of the number are in a way
unfit. They cannot earn a full day’s wage in a
highly competitive world, and their services and their
support can only be cared for by individual and flexible
labor relationship." (10c)
Mr. E.R. Lederer, (11) from a practical point of
view, feels that the law is really placing the United
States behind the American Federation of Labor; that
is, the company unions will be outlawed, and all the
benefits which such organizations actually have for
their employees will cease and the men enjoying them
will be deprived of the advantages. In reference to
the majority rule as s et up by the Act, Mr. Lederer
thinks it is very un-American and the forerunner of
the closed 3hop. "It certainly seems to be coercion
of the cruele stjkind to force a minority, unwilling to
pay the dues and submit to the by-laws of labor orga-
nizations, either to join in order to be permitted
to earn a livelihood or to be deprived of a job." (11a)
To continue: "It seems that all the burden under this
*. ,
-63-
bill is placed on industry and employers. If this
law is intended to give labor organizations such a
far-reaching authority, it certainly should provide
also for full responsibility of the individual labor
organization. As the bill now stands, it will, in
our opinion, encourage disputes, strikes and unrest,
and disrupt the progress industry has made in re-
employment and the improvement of our economic situation.”
(lib) Mr. Lederer, of course, has contradicted him-
self. "He points out the burden of Union membership
on unwilling minorities, and then, says calmly that
all the burden falls on industry and employers.
Evidently, he does not take his own first statement
very seriously." (11c)
Perhaps, the following (12) point of view suggests
the attitude underlying all the arguments in opposition
to the Wagner Act. "We are in favor of the purpose
cited by the bill but we are definitely of the opinion
that the bill, as written, will not only fail to ac-
complish the intended objectives, but will have the
opposite effect, that is, it will increase the causes
of labor disputes and deprive the worker of the indi-
vidual rights to which he, as a free American citizen.
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is entitled. The bill endorses and makes compulsory
the principle of majority rule for purposes of col-
lective bargaining. The rights of the minorities are
given little thought in the bill. Then, too, the
recognition of individual merit of workers may be made
practically impossible if by chance the majority of
the group in vhich an individual is working adopts
seniority as the criterion of advancement. The in-
evitable effect of the unfair labor practices will
be to diminish the highly desirable personal relation-
ship of management and men that has resulted from
years of close working contact. The Wagner bill, as
written, is unfair to both employees and employers.
It will have the direct effect of aggravating those
conditions which it is intended to improve, and there-
fore, retard recovery.
In a letter to Senator Walsh, a committee of
five (13) expresses the reasons for its opposition to
the bills
l/ It denies the minority a voice in vital mat-
ters affecting their welfare.
2/ In effect, it establishes a monopoly in labor
representation. Under existing conditions, it is e-
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vidently biased in favor of one organization.
3/ It does not place any responsibility or
limitations upon the majority, nor any restrictions
as to tactics employed. Even if labor organizations
are defeated in several instances, there is nothing
to prevent their intimidating and coercing the
majority.
4/ It releases a gigantic attempt to secure the
closed shop in industry. This would result in con-
siderable unrest as workers resisted this regimentation.
5/ The bill is not one of equity, even to the
workers whom it is intended to benefit.
To summarize the major arguments opposing the
Wagner bill, let us cite those made by Mr. Axtell
J. Byles, President of the American Petroleum Institute .( 14)
l/ Despite its avowed declaration, the bill does
not leave the individual employee or any minority group
of employees free to choose the method of bargaining.
2/ The bill is wrongly premised in that it will
foster discord and dispute between labor and management
rather than further peaceful industrial relationship.
The bill injects an outside organization between the
employees and their employer regardless of how effective
and satisfactory their collective bargaining agency has

been in the past.
3/ The bill proposes to direct by Government
fiat the type of labor union or organization which
may exist, thereby in effect creating a labor mono-
poly without authority in the Government to regulate
such a monopoly and compel observance of fair practice
It leads to further encroachment upon what are now re-
cognized as the inherent rights of labor.
4/ The bill confers upon a Labor Board and its
agents drastic, unwarranted, and probably unconsti-
tutional powers. As it stands, the bill is primarily
framed to confer rights and powers not upon American
labor but upon the National Labor Relations Board and
upon labor organizers. The Board could intercede to
establish the units of collective bargaining or to
render a decision on a controversy without invitation
from either parties concerned; or if both parties had
agreed to a procedure, including the selection of a
board of arbitration, the National Labor Relations
Board might intervene to change the procedure.
5/ The bill abrogates existing contracts between
employer and employees without regard to their merit
or benefit to either or both parties to the contract.
6/ The effect and probable intent of the bill
is to destroy what is known as u employee-representa-
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tion plans", many of which have existed satisfactorily
to workers in the particular company for a long period
of time.
Thus, we realize that the Wagner bill has its
faults and fallacies as well as its good points. It
Is easier, of course, to present arguments against
the Wagner Act; it is always so much easier to cri-
ticize a thing.’
Regarding the arguments presented in support of
and in opposition to the Act, there are three general
conclusions underlying them.
From the standpoint of employers, in general they
stand solidly against the Wagner Act. Typical of
employer-opposition is a statement made by Mr. James
A. Emery, counsel for the National Association of
Manufacturers, before a New York audience: "Your
Senator (Robert F. Wagner) proposed an anti-lynch
law for persecuted blacks; now he has sponsored a
new lynching law for Intimidated whites . " (15)
From the standpoint of employees and organized
labor, they stand, in general, solidly in support of
the law. However, some labor leaders privately con-
fess that the law may mean the end of trade unionism
in its present form. There is a basis for this fear.
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A business periodical recently predicted that within
five years organized labor would ask for the repeal
of the Wagner Act. (16)
From the standpoint of society, it is rather
difficult to decide. Organized labor, employees
and employers are generally in agreement with the
underlying objectives of the Act. Both sides do
not deny that industrial strife and economic ad-
justment are vital problems in our present system
and must be dealt with not only from society’s point
of view but also from the inefficiency and wasteful
results occurring from labor disputes. The arguments
presented, from the standpoint of society, seem to be
a question of method rather than purpose. The ar-
guments presented to support the Act attempt to show
that the Wagner Act is "the” law that has been lack-
ing to bring an end to labor disputes, lower wages and
lengthy working days; it explicitly and implicitly
promises, by means of collective bargaining, higher
wages, better working conditions, and so forth.
The arguments presented to oppose the Act at-
tempt to show that the Wagner Act is a law that will
tend, by its very nature, to increase labor disputes,




Enough time has not elapsed since the Act was
enacted into law to even attempt to show which one of
the opposing side may be justified. Until one side
or the other is justified by facts, opinions and




HISTGRICAJj PRECEDENTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
OF THE WAGNER ACT
In presenting this chapter, our purpose is to
note and perhaps be able to predict what success
the Wagner Act will have before the Federal Courts,
expecially the Supreme Court. Employers generally
are not greatly concerned over the Act in question
because they feel that the law will never be put
into general operation, and that it will experience
a fate similar to that of Section 7(a) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act if and when the
Act is tried before the Supreme Court.
Employers and labor organizations generally feel
just the opposite. For the basis of their arguments,
they point to several preceding laws and court
decisions. The constitutionality of the Wagner
Act is a question that must be settled sooner or
later. The employers are eager to have the Act tried
immediately; the administrators and supporters of the
law are rather reluctant in view of the recent deci-











In this chapter, then, we shall endeavor to point
out specific laws that have preceded the Wagner Act and
which have something in common with the Wagner Act.
In the latter half of this chapter, we shall consider
the more important issues upon which the Supreme
Court will be asked to pass judgment when controver-
sies involving them come before it.
HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS
The substantive feature of the National Labor
Relations Board are not new but merely codify and
clarify the policy already declared by Congress in
different fields of industry, trade, and transporta-
tion.
In 1926, the Railway Labor Act was enacted into
law. The purpose was to avoid labor controversies
between railway employers and employees because such
controversies were against the public interests. In
Section 2 of the Act (1), the collective bargaining
principle is in close analogy with the Wagner Act.
Section 2 provides that:
"First. It shall be the duty of all carriers, their
officers, agents, and employers, to exert every reason-






rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to
settle all disputes, whether arising out of the applica-
tion of such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid
any interruption to commerce or to the operation of
any carrier growing out of any dispute between the
carrier and the employees thereof.
Second. All disputes between a carrier and its
employees shall be considered and, if possible, decided
with all expedition, in conference between representa-
tives designated and authorized so to confer, respective-
ly, by the carriers and by the employees thereof interested
in the dispute.
Third. Representatives, for the purpose of this
act, shall be designated by the respective parties in
such manner as may be provided in their corporate
organization or unincorporated association, or by other
means of collective action, without interference,
influence, or coercion exercised by either party over
the self -organizati on or designation of representatives
by the other.
Fourth. In case of a dispute betv/een a carrier and
its employees, arising out of grievances or out of the
interpretation or application of agreements concerning
rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, it shall be
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the duty of the designated representative or representa-
tives of such carrier and of such employers, within ten
days after the receipt of notice of a desire on the part
of either party to confer in respect to such dispute,
to specify a time and place at which such conference shall
be held.” (2)
Surely the Wagner Act, which provides for collec-
tive bargaining between employees and employers, which
provides a method of representation for the employees and
the procedure in order to settle labor controversies,
does not differ from the Railway Act of 1926.' The
difference seems to be only in the wording of both
acts and the industries involved; the underlying prin-
ciple, however, is certainly the same.’
The Norris--La Guardia Anti-Injunction Act of 1932
(3) which is "An Act to amend the Judicial code and to
define and limit the jurisdiction of courts sitting on
equity and for other purposes." (4) It is the latest
federal pronouncement on the subject of contempt pro-
cedure and punishment. Note what a close analogy there
is between the Wagner Act and Section 2 of the Norris --
La Guardia Act which states that:
"Under prevailing economic conditions, developed with
the aid of governmental authority for owners of property
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to organize in the corporate and other forms of ownership
association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly
helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to
protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain accept-
able terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though
he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows,
it is necessary that he have full freedom of association^
self -organization, and designation of representatives
of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and condi-
tions of his employment, and that he shall be free from
the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers
of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such
representatives or in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection. " (4)
The Bankruptcy Act of March 3, 1933 has something
in common with the Wagner Act. (5) The purpose of this
act was to amend the Act of July 1, 1898 which esta-
blished a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the
U. S., Section 77, which is very much in common with
the Wagner Act, provides that:
"No judge or trustee acting under this act shall
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deny or in any way question the right of employees
in the property under his jurisdiction to join the
labor organization of their choice, and it shall be
unlawful for any judge, trustee, or receiver to inter-
fere in any way with the organization of employees,
or to use the funds of the railroad under his juris-
diction, in maintaining so-called ’company unions' or
to influence or coerce employees in an effort to induce
them to join or remain members of such company unions.
"No judge, trustee, or receiver acting under this
act shall require any person seeking employment on the
property under his jurisdiction to sign any contract
or agreement promising to join or to refuse to join a
labor organization; and if such contract has been
enforced on the property prior to the property coming
under the jurisdiction of said judge, trustee, or re-
ceiver, then the said judge, trustee, or receiver, as
soon as the matter is called to his attention, shall
notify the employees by an appropriate order that said
contract has been discarded and is no longer binding
on them in any way . " ( 6
)
Section 7 (e) of the Act establishing a Federal

Coordinator of Transportation (7) is closely allied
with certain aspects of the Wagner Act. This Act was
enacted into law "to relieve the existing national
emergency in relation to interstate railroad transpcr -
tation." (8) Section 7 (e) of this Act merely pro-
vides that employers must comply with the provisions
of the acts we have already discussed.
It provides that:
"Carriers whether under control of a judge, trustee,
receiver, or private management, shall he required to
comply with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act
and with the provisions of section 77 of the bankrupt-
cy act approved March 3, 1933." (8)
We have already notated the close alliance that
existed between section 7 (a) of the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act and the Wagner Act. (9)
In presenting the historical precedents of the
Act, the purpose is not to be exhaustive. On the
other hand, it is to show that the constitutional
basis for the 'Wagner Act is not new as we have shown
by the preceding discussion; it is merely an applica-
tion of the principle of collective bargaining to
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labor and industry in general, while preceding laws
on the same principle apply to specific industries.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The constitutionality or unconstitutionality of
the Wagner Act is (or can be) based on several issues.
Writers on the subject, however, generally agree that
the validity of the Act is dependent on four import-
ant issues:
1. Due Process of Law.
2. Interstate Commerce
3. Unwarranted Delegation of Powers.
4. Freedom of Association.
Due Process Of Law:
On behalf of the employers, it is contended that
the National Labor Relations Act violates the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution which states, in part,
that Congress shall make no law which "deprives a
person of his life, liberty, or property without due
process of law". Due process of law is a limitation
upon the power of Congress to legislate and is a guar-
antee of fair treatment in terms of social and economic
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ideals. It means, furthermore, that Congress in esta-
blishing standards of conduct, must not interfere with
a person’s liberty unless there is some social and
economic justification for such interference. Among
other things, a person's liberty includes freedom of
contract. Of course, interpretation of the laws by
Congress rest conclusively with the Supreme Court of
the United States; "due process 1 ' in fact merely means
what a majority of the Supreme Court consider "due"
.
As the AAA minority pointed out, it is used by the
Court to assume any veto power that it feels is
proper. (10)
If we recall section 8 of the Wagner Act which
defines the unfair labor practices (11), no one can
deny that the section is designed to interfere with
the employer’s and employee's freedom to mahe indi-
vidual contracts. As Dr. Donaldson states it, the
section removes restrictions from one type of "free
contract" and puts new ones on others. No absolutely
free contract can exist in any society. One contract
restricts another so do the lav/s. The corporation




-often-- of real owner-ship.
From the viewpoint of the employer, Section 8 cf
the Act interferes with the employer's freedom to make
contracts with his employees, it forbids him to inter-
fere with his employees, it forbids discrimination ag-
ainst an employee in order to discourage or encourage
membership in a labor organization and it forbids an
employer to help or support such labor organization.
Finally, the employer is forced to bargain collective-
ly with a view of reaching an agreement on wages, hours
and working conditions.
From the point of view of the employees. Section
8 tends to limit their freedom of contract. It will
certainly tend to eliminate employees making individual
contracts with their employers. The Act requires that
the minority be represented by representatives not cf
their own choosing. Practically speaking, the Act,
from its very nature, may force employees to either
quit their jobs or join a particular labor organiza-
tion.
Strict enforcement of various provisions of the
vVagner Labor Act will very often interfere with the
..
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freedom of contract both of the employer and the em-
ployee. Under such conditions, the Supreme Court will
have to decide whether, under modern conditions, there
.is some social and economic justification for such
interference with the freedom of contract. The Supreme
Court will have to decide whether the object of the
law is justifiable to interfere with the individual
rights as set up by the Fifth Amendment of the Consti-
tution.
No one will deny not even the Supreme Court
that the object of the law, namely, to lessen industrial
strife, to remove burdens of interstate commerce, and
in general to stabilize the economic system by encour-
aging collective bargaining between employees and em-
ployers, is a legitimate object. In this connection,
the really important issue is whether the method pro-
vided by the Act for the accomplishment of the object-
ive is fair, reasonable and effective under modern
conditions. If the method employed is fair, reasonable
and effective, the Supreme Court can deny due-process
to individuals affected by the Act providing there is




In presenting his Senate Report (12) to Congress,
Senator Walsh pointed out a recent decision by the
Supreme Court (13) on the due-process point. The case
was brought in court to restrain the railroad from in-
terfering with the right of its employees to self-organi-
zation and the designation of representatives in violation
of the Railway Labor Act of 1926. The Supreme Court
compelled the railroad company "(a) to completely dis-
establish its company union as representative of its
employees; (b) to reinstate the brotherhood as the
representative of all employees until they should make
another free choice; (c) to restore to service and to
reinstate certain employees who had been discharged
for activities in behalf of the brotherhood.” (14)
The Supreme Court continues:
"The legality of collective action on the part of
employees in order to safeguard their proper interests
is not to be disputed. It has long been recognized
that employees are entitled to organize for the pur-
pose of securing the redress of grievances and to
promote agreements with employers relating to rates
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of pay and conditions of work.” (15)
Considering the first four unfair labor practices
(16), there is some basis to believe that the Supreme
Court will not find any constitutional flaws with them
since they are designed to protect workers in the exer-
cise of their rights. In a sense, labor has tradi-
tionally, but not legally, always enjoyed such rights
as set up by the first four unfair labor practices.
In the light of such traditional rights, many who
opposed the Act before the Committee on Education
and Labor argued on the principle that the law was
unnecessary since labor already did enjoy such rights.
From the point of view of due process of law, the
doubtful aspect of Section 8 seems to lie in the fifth
unfair labor practice which declares that "it shall be
an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees”. This unfair labor practice undoubtedly
interferes directly with the right of persons to have
freedom of association as stated in the Constitution.
One author (17) explains the effect that the fifth






intended to do something more than equalize the bar-
gaining power between employer and employee; it is
clearly intended to force the employer to enter into
collective agreements with the representatives of a
majority of workers within a given bargaining unit.
This, as previously pointed out, if it means any-
thing at all, will inevitably operate as a species
of unilateral compulsory arbitration. Section 13
of the Act expressly reserves to employees the right
to strike. This means that employees may at any time
strike against a proposal of an employer or even
against an unfavorable decision of the Labor Board.
The employer, however, is forced under threat of
penalty to bargain with a view of reaching an agree-
ment, although lie is not forced to agree to anything.
In practice, this is likely to mean that in many
situations the employer will be forced to make conces-
sions for the sake of peace, not because he is con-
vinced of the justice of the demands of the workers
and not because of their collective strength, but
because of the fear of the disciplinary action which
the government may take if he does not make some con-
cessions. This is not true collective bargaining.
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It is government wage-fixing by indirection. It
is a species of unilateral compulsory arbitration."
Of course, the fifth unfair labor practice does
not openly avow compulsory arbitration. But it has
an indirect effect to do that very thing; it compels
the employer to reach an agreement which he otherwise
would not make with his employees while the government
stands by with a threat to penalize his refusals.
It is the fifth unfair labor practice that makes
the Wagner Act unconstitutionally unreliable. The
government, of course, will argue that this fifth un-
fair labor practice is valid in view of the disparity
in bargaining power between employer and employee,
that under modern conditions the mere protection of
employees to organize is not sufficient and that,
therefore, the government through the National Labor
Relations Board must throw its weight behind organized
labor in forcing employers to reach collective agree-
ments. One author (18) concludes:
"Although the Supreme Court may be persuaded to accept
the government’s viewpoint, the odds are against the
possibility.
"






in Section 9 (a) of the Wagner Act will also he most
vigorously contested. Section 9 (a) provides that
representatives of the employees shall be chosen by
a majority rule in a given unit and such representa-
tives shall be exclusive representatives of the en-
tire unit. In this respect, employers will contend
that this section of the Act unreasonably interferes
with their freedom of contract by preventing them
from bargaining with individuals or minority groups.
Minority groups and individuals, if stimulated by
employers, will make a similar objection to the
majority rule.
However, the government will argue that the
majority rule is not actually a part of the objective
of the Wagner Act but only an incident of the employ-
er's duty, established by the Act, to bargain collec-
tively with the representatives of the employees.
"It is merely a mechanism or device which Congress has
authorized the Labor Board to employ in carrying out
the social policy crystallized in the fifth unfair
labor practice." (19)
If we admit that the majority rule is only a
"means to an end", the only question with which the
Court need concern itself is whether the majority rule
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is a fair and reasonable device in a scheme of collec-
tive bargaining. It seems, of course, that the majority
rule, while it may not be the best, is certainly a fair
and reasonable means for collective bargaining; and it
must be remembered that due process of law does not re-
quire that Congress adopt the best available means; it
requires only that Congress use fair and reasonable
means to accomplish its legitimate ends.
If the Supreme Court adopts the viewpoint of the
government that the majority rule is merely a fair
and reasonable means to. accomplish an end it seems
unlikely that the Supreme Court will find any fault
with the majority rule as a means of collective-bar-
gaining representation.
However, if the Court should decide against the
fifth unfair labor practice which states that the em-
ployer cannot refuse to bargain collectively with his
employee’s representatives, then the majority rule as
declared in Section 9 (a) of the Act will lose its
significance since the provisions of Section 9 (a)
depend on the fifth unfair labor practice. In such
an event, of course, whether the employer will or
v/ill not receive representatives for all employees
will become a matter of "voluntary negotiations

-92-
and collective strength.” (20)
In regard to due process of law, it also means
that Congress must establish a legal machinery to pro-
vide for every person a fair hearing. The Supreme
Court has always held that a judicial review is an
indispensable element of a fair hearing.
Now, it is doubtful whether the National Labor
Relations Act makes any provisions for a judicial
review of the proceedings of the Labor Board, and if
the Court concludes that the Act neither expressly or
by implication provides for a judicial review, the
Act will be held invalid under the "due process of
lav/” clause. However, there is always the possibi-
lity that the Court may be persuaded to rule in
favor of the Act following the legislative intent
expressed in the Report of the Senate Committee on
Education and Labor. (21)
Interstate Commerce:
If the "freedom of association" and "protection
of life, liberty and property" are given as arguments
to oppose the Wagner Act, the question of interstate
commerce will not matter. However, the problem of
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interstate commerce is another method of attacking the
constitutionality of the act* and hence, must be con-
sidered. The Constitution of the United States pro-
vides that Congress shall have the power 'to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the several
states and with the Indian Tribes" . The Supreme Court
has interpreted this clause to mean that Congress has
not only the power to regulate interstate commerce but
also the power to regulate intrastate commerce which
directly and substantially affects commerce. (22)
This issue has come to the front ever since the
Supreme Court in the Schechter case declared that a
handler of live poultry in the state of New York was
not engaged in interstate commerce and therefore, not
subject to federal control under the National Indust-
rial Recovery Act because the poultry had come to a
permanent rest within the state. In this connection,
however, even if the case had involved goods which con-
tinued to flow from New York to another state, it does
not appear that the Supreme Court would have reversed
its decision although there would have been an effect
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on commerce and an obstruction to the free flow of
goods. It seems that the Supreme Court would have
found some way to "scrap" the National Industrial
Recovery Act on the ground that it was not working
well; and after all, the practical function of the
court is, or should be, to destroy anything that does
not work well. It resembles, in this respect, the
English jury which destroys unpopular or obsolete law
by refusing to enforce it. (23)
The problem facing the Supreme Court will be to
determine whether a labor controversy affects inter-
state commerce and obstructs the free flow of goods
from one state to another. No fast rule can be laid
down as to what the Supreme Court will decide when
dealing with this point. Writers agree that the de-
cision on this issue will depend entirely on the case
being considered by the Court.
If the case being considered involves a labor
controversy which is a direct obstruction to inter-
state commerce, then the Supreme Court will undoubt-
edly hold the Act valid on this point. "However, it
seems fairly certain that the Supreme Court will not
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extend the application of the Act to include labor
controversies which merely have an indirect effect
upon interstate commerce." (24)
Hence, we realize that the Supreme Court will
have to decide a question of fact, namely, whether a
strike in a certain factory will affect commerce.
The answer lies with the particular case that is be-
ing considered by the Supreme Court, and in this re-
spect, no one can even attempt a prediction until a
specific case goes to trial before the Supreme Court.
The entire issue of the commerce clause of the
Constitution in its relation to the Wagner Act is well
summed-up by one author. (25) "It is not likely that
the Court will declare the Labor Act unconstitutional
on the ground that Congress is attempting to regulate
intrastate commerce in an unwarranted manner. It is
more likely that the Court will in individual contro-
versies decide whether a given labor controversy falls
under the jurisdiction of the Board."
"On the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court
with respect to the scope and meaning of the commerce
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clause of the Constitution, it is impossible to pre-
dict the extent to which the Court will go in permit-
ting the Labor Board to assume jurisdiction over labor
controversies. The Court will, of course, permit the
Board to intervene in all labor disputes arising in
business and industries which are directly or indirect-
ly engaged in the task of transporting goods, persons,
or communications from one state to another. It is
entirely possible that the Court will permit applica-
tion of the statute to controversies arising in busi-
nesses which are in the current of commerce from state
to state. It seems fairly certain that the Court will
not permit the Board to intervene in labor controversies
which affect commerce only indirectly through their
effect on wage and price levels. There is, however,
a strong possibility that it will give such a broad
interpretation to the term 'affecting commerce' as to
include practically all national businesses and in-
dustries .
"
Unwarranted Delegation of Powers:






ing as the preceding two, on which the constitutional
validity of the Wagner Act may depend. It is sometimes
argued by the opposers of the Act that Congress has
given to the Labor Board "unwarranted delegation of
powers". That is, "it will be contended that Congress,
in giving the Labor Board power to refine its defini-
tions of unfair labor practices and to pass judgment
upon the conduct of employers in specific situations,
has combined legislative and judicial powers in an
administrative board in violation of the theory of
separation of governmental powers set forth by impli-
cation in the National Constitution." (26)
The opposition to the Wagner Act will point to
one of the arguments on which the National Industrial
Recovery Act was held unconstitutional. In substance,
the Supreme Court declared that while Congress has
the authority to delegate "powers to elaborate social
policies for purposes of administration, it must define




In this connection, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes ex-
pressed the thought quite well: "In view of the scope
of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the
few restrictions that are imposed, the President in
approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws
for the government of trade and industry throughout
the country, is virtually unfettered. We think that
the code -making authority thus conferred is an un-
constitutional delegation of legislative power.
There is no doubt that the powers given the
president by Congress under the National Industrial
Recovery Act "transcended all reasonable bounds". It
is doubtful, however, whether the Supreme Court will
declare the Wagner Act unconstitutional on such an
argument. In the first p1-ace, Congress in Section 8
of the Act (unfair labor practices) has defined its
policy with considerable "sharpness, particularity
and accuracy". In fact, Congress has gone so far
in defining its p olicy that the Labor Board has very
little chance of expanding or contracting the con-
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cept of unfair labor practices.
In the second place. Congress has delegated the
same powers of the National Labor Relations Board to
other administrative bodies in the past. In creating
the Interstate Commerce Commission by the adoption of
the Interstate Commerce Act of 1889, Congress has fol-
lowed the practice ever since when creating boards and
commissions, and vesting in them different types of
governmental powers; the Supreme Court has always
approved such delegation of governmental powers pro-
viding Congress has taken proper precaution in esta-
blishing such administrative machinery.
The objection of unwarranted delegation of govern-
mental pavers was urged against the validity of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. The similarity between
the powers of the Federal Trade Commission and the
National Labor Beard is so much that a statement is-
sued by the Supreme Court in favor of the Federal
Trade Commission will be sufficient to show the atti-




"The constitutionality of the act is assailed,
first, as assuming to combine legislative, executive
and judicial powers and functions and to confer them
upon one and the same body, contrary to Articles I,
II, III of the Constitution, and because it assumes
to authorize the Commission, which is ostensibly an
administrative body, to deprive persons of their
property without due process of lav/, contrary to the
fifth amendment to the Constitution. 1
"This proposition is to our minds without merit.
Congress plainly has the power to declare unfair meth-
ods of competition unlawful and to require that their
practice cease. This Congress has done by the act in
question. It with equal clearness has the pov/er to
authorize an administrative commission to determine
(a) the question of v/hat methods of competition the
given trader employes, and (b) provisionally, the
mixed question of law and fact, whether such methods
are unfair. These questions being determined against
the trader, the administrative requirement to cease
and desist, prescribed by Congress, follows as a
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matter of course, but only provisionally. The Com-
mission’s determination of these questions is not
final. Not only does the statute give a right of
review thereon upon application by the aggrieved
trader to a circuit court of appeals of the U. S.
but the Commission’s order is not enforceable by
the Commission but only by order of a court.” (28)
We can conclude that if the Labor Board does
not go beyond its powers delegated to it by Congress,
the Supreme Court will not find the Constitutional
validity of the Wagner Act vulnerable in this re-
spect .
No case regarding the constitutionality of the
Wagner Act has yet to reach the Supreme Court. Very
few cases have gone before the Federal Courts and at
present we have only one case in which the Federal
Court has decided against the Wagner Act.
The Majestic Flour Mill of Aurora, Montana,
brought a case against the National Labor Relations
Board before the Federal Court of Kansas City. The
dispute between the Labor Board and the Mill arose
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when the Regional Labor Board, attempting to iron-out
a labor controversy which led to a nine -day shut-dowi
of the Flour Mill and failure by the Mill to re-employ
fifty-one workmen, ordered the officials of the Mill
to appear at a hearing in Springfield, Montana, to
answer to the complaint by the employees.
In its complaint against the Mill, the Union
charged that the officials attempted to induce em-
ployees to withdraw from the Union, and to form a
company union in violation of the Wagner Act. The
Mill, the complaint further stated, refused to bar-
gain collectively with its organized workers and pre-
ferred to deal with its employees individually.
The Mill officials declared, however, that they
did recognize and deal with the unions but were forced
to close the plant when wage, hour and personal demands
became such that they could no longer operate profit-
ably.
Refusing to abide by the order of the Regional
Labor Board, the officials of the Mill asked the Federal
Court of Kansas City for a temporary injunction which
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was granted for one week; thereafter, seeking to have
the Act declared unconstitutional, the Mill’s officials
asked for a permanent injunction against the National
Labor Relations Board on the following allegations: (29)
1. That the company is engaged solely in intra-
state commerce and Congress has no right under Section
8, Article 1 of the Constitution to attempt regulation
of its business.
2. That the Act purports "to deprive complainants
of liberty and property without due process of law con-
trary to the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.
3. That it would deprive them of the right of
trial in violation of the Seventh Amendment.
4. That the powers sought to be exercised by
Congress in enacting the act are powers reserved to
the states under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
5. That the proceedings of the National Labor
Relations Board under provisions of the act, consti-
tute an unwarranted invasion and interference with
complainant's right to hire employees, enter into




The case was fought before the federal court of
Kansas City with Federal Judge Merrill E. Otis pre-
siding. On December 21, 1935, he ruled that the
Wagner Act was unconstitutional. The opinion was
the first federal court ruling on the legality of
the Wagner Act.
In ruling against the validity of the Act, Judge
Otis stressed the Interstate Commerce issue and de-
clared that Congress had exceeded its constitutional
right "to regulate commerce with foreign and the sev-
eral states."
As in the Schecter Case, Judge Otis, in substance,
declared that the Flour Mill was doing a business that
in no way affected commerce or obstructed the free flow
of goods from one state to another either directly or
indirectly. The Judge declared: "Congress has no
power to regulate that which merely affects commerce.
There is no way in which any of the specified unfair
labor practices in any business, whether mill or mine
or factory or store, conceivably can directly affect
commerce" (30) Judge Ctis clearly points out in his




small establishment engaged exclusively in manufactu-
ring which is an entirely local business. He continues
to show that the intent of the entire Wagner Act is to
subject the relation of employees and employers in even
small intrastate institutions to the control of the
National Government. Judge Otis continues: "In so far
as the Act impliedly prohibits a refusal by employers
in such a flour mill as that at Aurora to bargain col-
lectively with their employees and prohibits indivi-
dual bargaining, is it constitutional? Unless it is
authorized by the commerce clause of the Constitution
of the United States, it is not constitutional. That
clause is: ’The Congress shall have power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes’. Under the com-
merce clause, in so far as we are here concerned with
it. Congress has power to regulate one thing only.
That is: ’commerce among the several states'. Nothing
else can be regulated by virtue of this power."
"It is inaccurate to say that under the commerce
clause, Congress can regulate that which, not itself
a part of commerce among the stages, directly affects
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that commerce because it may regulate commerce, it
may shield it, it may protect it, from that which
would directly affect it by burdening or obstruct-
ing it
.
"It is only when that outside thing actually im-
pinges or is about to impinge on commerce that it
can be reached by the power of Congress. The impinge-
ment may be prevented, for that is a regulation of
commerce, but what goes on before and outside impinge-
l
ment or the threat of it is beyond the power of Con-
gress. "
"Manufacturing is not commerce nor any part of
commerce. Nothing more firmly is established in
constitutional law than that. Congress, therefore,
under the commerce power cannot regulate manufacturing.
Hence, it cannot regulate the relations between em-
ployers and employees in manufacturing, as commerce.
Never can these relations be any part of commerce.
The Labor Board states that commerce may be affected
by these relations."
"But it is absurd to say that the refusal of the
owner of a flour mill to bargain collectively with his
employees directly affects commerce among the states."
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"If Congress can legislate to prevent that which
indirectly and remotely or even directly and immedia-
tely might lessen the production of goods intended in
whole or in part to he transported in interstate com-
merce after production, then its power is unlimited. u
In concluding his decision. Judge Otis declared
the Wagner Act could only be valid if a constitution-
al amendment were made giving power to Congress to
regulate the type of commerce expressed and implied
in the Act. "When such an amendment is enacted, the
statute (Wagner Act), if then re-enacted, will cer-
tainly be constitutional. But not until then.'" (31)
Thus, in its first trial before a federal court,
the Wagner Act has failed. The question now seems to
be: "Will the Supreme Court follow the same ruling
of the federal court and declare the Act unconstitu-
tional, or wi^l the Supreme Court declare that there
is in our modern system some social and economic




THE EFFECTS GF THE WAGNER ACT
In developing this chapter, I had hoped that the
Wagner Act had had specific effects on employers,
employees, and labor organizations to regulate them
herein. However, either employers and organized
labor have been reluctant In giving such information,
or the Wagner Act has had no effects. The Act has
been enacted into lav/ not quite seven months, and the
National Labor Relations Board created by the Act has
been actually operating only for the last six months,
(September IS, 1935)
In view of such facts, the best that this thesis
can do is to point out the short-run and the long-run
effects that the National Labor Relations Act may have
on the various groups concerned.
in order to get information regarding the effects
of the Wagner Act, I sent out a questionnaire to persons
who are leaders in labor circles. They were very care-
fully selected; they had all expressed their opinion on
the Act before the Committee on Education and Labor.
Out of one-hundred questionnaires fifty to persons
who supported the Act and fifty to those who opposed
it thirty-four answered. Hov/ever, the results were
very interesting; instead of remitting the questionnaire,
letters were remitted. In substance, the general thought
of those who answered was that it is too premature to
decide what effects the Wagner Act has had to date. In
the Appendix (appendix DD), the reader will find a copy
of the questionnaire, also, names of those to whom a
questionnaire was sent, (appendix EE).
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First let us review the activities of the
National Labor Board. Over a space of less than
four months (October, 1935- -January, 1936) the Labor
Board has handled three-hundred and ninety-five cases.
From this total, the Board has only rendered two de-
cisions. At the present time, there are nine cases
pending in various courts in which the respondent com-
panies are attempting to restrain the Board from en-
forcing the provisions of the Wagner Act. We can best
explain the effects of the Labor Board on industries
statistically: (1)
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-110 -
From such statistics, we can see that although
the Labor Board is functioning, it is doing so very
slowly. It is quite probable that labor disputes
will increase which will mean an increase in the num-
ber of cases going before the Labor Board. If the
cases increase at the same rate that they have
during the months cited above and the Board can only
issue a relatively small percentage of decisions, the
Board will be very inefficient and certainly not
doing much toward the intended objectives of the Act.
Of course such inefficiency is explained by
the Labor Board officials as a result of the in-
adequate appropriation to meet the rapidly growing
demand for its services, and a personnel staff too
small to "even take care of routine correspondence
under normal conditions". (2) The Board has an
appropriation of about v50,000 per month and has
only twenty-one regional agencies throughout the
United States. An increase will mean an increased
monthly appropriation; without an increase, the
Labor Board cannot do justice to its position. There-
fore, the question seems to be whether such a tre-
mendous increase in expenditures will be justified
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in the light of the Labor Board's accomplishments.
The tremendous expenditures of the Board was one
argument presented by the Secretary of Labor, Miss
Frances Perkins, opposing the independence of the
Labor Board. However, it can be stated that truth
fully she cared very little for the expenses
they would be approximately the same even if the
Labor Board was made a part of the Department of
Labor but Miss Perkins wanted to have the
Labor Board controlled by the Department of Labor.
Undoubtedly, the Act has set up a new bureau
or department which will keep on increasing its
personnel staff and its expenditures. Of course,
the Roosevelt Administration will be at least re-
membered in history for the inumerable new depart-
mental establishments, and we may suppose that one
more or less, such as the Labor Board, makes very
little difference to the present generation. The
difference will be credited to future generations.
In deciding the Pittsburgh C-reyhound Case,
the first and most effective decision the Labor
Board has yet to render, the Board found that the
Company was engaging in three of the five unfair
labor practices stated in the Wagner Act. The

labor dispute in this company really had. its start
in July 26, 1933 when the company, in order to re-
strain its employees from joining a union, organized
a company union. The significant aspects of the
company union were:
1/ Membership was automatic; there were no
dues, no membership applications or cards.
2/ Only employees of the respondents were
eligible to represent the employees.
3/ Management had veto power over any pro-
posed change in the Association.
4/ No provision was made for employee meet-
ings so there was no regular method for the em-
ployees to formulate their wishes or to instruct
their delegates.
5/ Provision was made whereby the employee
representatives got time off for their duties as
well as transportation and expenses.
6/ All expenses of the Association were born
by the management.
7/ The set up of the plan enabled the manage-
ment to "pick and choose those matters which it could
talk over with its employees."
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In other words, the company union was only a
farce, wholly managed and supervised by the Grey-
hound Lines.
When the employees began to doubt the sin-
cerity of the company union, they contacted the
American Federation of Labor and a charter was is-
sued by the latter May, 1935. Since then, seven
employees who were instrumental in joining the
union were discharged.
In answer to the complaint, the respondents
contended that the employees of the company were
garage men whose duties it was to keep the vehicles
in condition and, therefore, could not come under
the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board.
However, the Board thought differently, In
determining the applicability of the Act, the Board
found that the operations conducted at the Pitt-
sburgh garage were an integral part of the inter-
state bus transportation system operated and managed
by the respondent companies. The acts of the re-
spondents occurred in the course and conduct of
interstate transportation and affected employees
engaged in operations in the course and conduct of




Furthermore, the Board felt that the acts of
the respondents in threatening the employees with
the loss of their jobs created fear and nervousness
which was a threat to the safe and efficient oper-
ation of these instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce. Strikes were threatened which would have
burdened interstate commerce.
Therefore, since the Board found that the
Wagner Act did apply to the Greyhound Lines, it is-
sued the following orders. They are given here
in brief form:
1/ Cease and desist from in any manner in-
terfering with, restraining, or coercing their
employees in the exercise of their rights to self-
organization, to form, join or assist labor or-
ganization, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as
guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Re-
lations Act.
2/ Cease and desist from discouraging mem-
bership in the union by discrimination in regard to




3/ Cease and desist from in any manner
dominating or interfering with the administration
of the Employees Association of the Pennsylvania
Greyhound Lines, Inc., or any other labor organi-
zation of their employees.
4/ Offer to reinstate all former employees
with pay suffered by reason of their discharge.
Recognize future representatives of their employees.
Let us consider what bearing the Wagner Act
has on the employers. To the employers who treat
their workers in such a manner that the latter are
satisfied with their relative status, the effects
of the Wagner Act cannot be very far-reaching. In
fact Senator Wagner made it quite plain that the
Act is not intended for the employers who make it
a principle to treat workers fair and reasonably;
who realize that labor is not just a commodity that
can be treated as if it were wheat or corn in the
open market. The Wagner Act can only effect such
employers in an educational, evolutionary method.
The Wagner Act is intended, however, to ef-
fect drastically those employers who think of labor
as any ordinary article on the open market and who
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are ready to exploit the laborer to his barest
subsistence level. Such employers do not seem to
realize that a higherjwage level means an increased
purchasing power for the worker. But rather think
of wages as a part of the total cost of their pro-
duct which must be decreased when and as much as
possible
.
In the past it has been a frequent experience
of government that when they have attempted to in-
troduce or interfere with existing labor policies,
the unintended results of such policies are more
important than the intended results.
To be sure, labor organizations have increased
their membership enrollment significantly during
the last two yearsO a gain which is most
promising because it has occurred in the midst of
a severe depression. The gain, of course, may
be a direct effect of the Wagner Act and other re-
cent labor laws; nevertheless, the employers,
quite naturally, resist the efforts of the govern-
ment to replace their labor policies with its own
policy. The Wagner bill has had the direct effect
of antagonizing employers who, in order to resist
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the spread of labor organizations and collective
bargaining, are employing all kinds of devices.
They discriminate against men and discharge them
for union activity. They endeavor to quiet dis-
content by raising wages. One author (3) firmly
believes that the rise in wages since 1934 has
partly been due to the union organization move-
ment since that date.
One noteworthy effect of the Wagner Act is
that it is the cause for the establishment of
many employee -represent at ion committees or com-
pany unions. This is interesting in view of the
fact that the Wagner Act is intended to eliminate
employer -dominated company unions. The plans,
"when well operated, are an exceedingly effective
arrangement for adjusting grievances (and in pre-
venting them) and for keeping managers informed
of what is on the worker’s mind. The movement
to establish employee-representation plans was
really a result of the rapid gains of the trade
unions during the war, but it made little pro-
gress during the twenties when union membership
was stationary or slowly dropping. Indeed, from
1926 until the summer of 1933, the number of
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employee-representation plans actually diminished.
With the passage of the Recovery Act, there was a
rush to organize committees and within several
months, the number in existence doubled. Thus,
the government’s efforts to encourage labor orga-
nization have stimulated improvements in personnel
administration and, therefore, made the organiza-
tion of the men under labor auspices in many plants
more, instead of less, difficult. H (4)
The devices used by employers have undoubt-
edly been obstacles to the trade union movement,
and the law of the Wagner Act may be regarded as
reflecting the conviction of msny labor leaders
that a large part of the American workmen, par-
ticularly those in the mass production industries,
cannot be organized into independent unions with-
out the help of the government. However, whether
it is so or not, one important effect of the
Wagner Act to date is that it has stimulated an
improvement in the personnel practices and the per-
sonnel administration of employers.
The fact that the Act is one-sided and aimed,
indirectly at least, against employers, does by
its very nature, affect the attitude of employers.
Employers insist that the majority rule clause and
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the authority of the Labor Relations Board to de-
termine bargaining units deprive employers and
minorities of rights guaranteed them by the Fifth
Amendment. They argue that the obligation imposed
on employers to bargain collectively is arbitrary
and unreasonable because no corresponding duty is
imposed on the employees. They assert that the
Act goes beyond the power of Congress to regulate
commerce, despite the restrictions that it places
upon the jurisdiction of the Labor Board. Then,
toe, we must remember that the battle is really
between employers and labor organizations. Men
who rise to high posts, both in management and
labor organization, are often of the domineering
type and the difficulties of cooperation, because
of individual differences, are substantial. How-
ever, "the record of American industry warrants
the conclusion that there is at least a reasonable
possibility of developing effective cooperation
between organized labor and management." (5)
Regardless of whether the Act is constitutional
or not, in judging the short-run results of the Act,
it is sensible to conclude that conservative em-
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ployers will formulate their labor policies on the
assumption that the Act is constitutional. On
this basis, the immediate effects of the Wagner
Act will be very different from those intended.
The immediate effect of the Act is bound to
stimulate great improvements in personnel admini-
stration and the treatment of the v/orkers by the
employers. A similar effect was felt when
Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery
Act was adopted. Whereas the Section just men-
tioned caused employers to establish hundreds of
employee-representation plans, the Wagner Act
will lead many employers to improve the operation
of them as well as to establish many more.
The ultimate effect of the Wagner Act on
employers is different, however. It is safe to
assume that, regardless of the validity of this
particular law, this and future administrations
will throw their influence behind the essential
policy represented by the Wagner Act, namely,
the protection of employees in their right to or-
ganize v/ithout interference by employers and in
their right to bargain collectively through repre-
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sentatlves of their own choosing. (6) Assuming that
we are correct, the ultimate effects of the Wagner
Act will be very much to the liking of the trade
unions or organized labor. A gradual evolution
of employee -representation plans will eventually
lead to the strengthening of the powers of labor
organizations. It is obvious that when employees
attempt to bargain collectively, company unions
will change rapidly. Employees will expect ex-
pert representatives to meet the employer and they
will, of course, look to labor organizations for
such help. Hence, "ultimately the policy of the
Wagner Act may be expected to produce a growth in
union membership, and a spread of collective bar-
gaining” , (7) which will directly have the effect
of restricting the employers in their labor
j
practices, particularly unfair labor practices.
Another vital effect of the Wagner Act is the
fear which the labor policy arouses among employers.
Government labor policies have always aroused fear
among employers so that, in reality, the Wagner Act
has increased the degree of fear among them. It
is the fear of employers that the labor movement
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will become highly political. Of course, employers
are justified in having such fear. The growing
dependence of the trade unions on the government
will compel the labor movement, which in this
country has been primarily an economic movement,
to become highly political. Employers fear the
rising political power of labor. They point out
that under the Wagner Act only employers are
capable of committing an unfair labor practice,
but it does nothing to assure that the labor or-
ganizations are responsible, that they have not
been captured by racketeers, or that agreements, if
made, can be enforced. At present, the need for
close holding of labor unions to honesty and public
duty is not sufficiently realized. Hence, it is
suggested that the real danger is not that the
government will dominate the trade unions but that
the trade unions will dominate the government, that
the government will be too subservient to organized
labor to develop anything approaching a national
labor policy, that the government will be used by
the trade unions for their own purposes, and that
the government’s labor policy will in essence be
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trade -union policy backed by the sanction of law. (8)
In essence, it is the fear on the part of
employers and certain labor organizations
that organized special groups, often called "pres-
sure-groups”, will grip the labor movement. No
one would eliminate pressure groups entirely in
a free society, because it is only by means of such
groups that we can assert that society is free; yet,
the fear lies in the idea that such pressure groups
can so dominate the government that public policy
becomes a policy of selected groups rather than a
national policy.
I think it is well to duplicate, in part, a
letter sent to me by the Caterpillar Tractor Com-
pany (9) in answer to my questionnaire. From the
letter we can conclude that the Wagner Act will
tend to effect mostly those employers who exploit
their employees. "In so far as this company is
concerned, we have witnessed no effects from the
passage of this Act. We have no company union,
nor has any attempt been made to organize an em-
ployee un'on. We are pursuing, and will continue




the payment of relatively high wages and upon fair
treatment to our men. We hope and believe that
as long as such a policy is pursued, no justifica-
tion will arise and no reason will exist for the
application, or attempted application, of this new
Federal law to any satisfactorily established em-
ployer-employee relationship.”
What effects has the Act had, or will have,
on employees? Regardless of what the immediate
effects and the ultimate effects of the Wagner
Act shall be, whether it benefits the employer or
labor organization, employees will benefit at any
rate from the Act. We have already noticed that
employers, in order to avoid the policies of the
Act, are generally speaking, increasing wages,
improving the treatment of their employees, modi-
fying or completely abandoning objectionable bonus
plans and in some cases, even protecting employees
against arbitrary lay-off by granting them seniority
f
rights. Although the employers' purposes are to
hinder the organized movement, the actual effect of
the Act is to raise the general standard of the em-
ployees in respect to wages, hours and conditions
of work;

Another effect that the Wagner Act has had, and
will continue to have, is that it will tend to en-
courage the organization of workers. Whatever the
employers may do to restrain this organization
movement will be of no avail. With the government
behind them, labor organizations will act as ”pree-
sure groups” on the employees who will, eventually
at least, either join a labor organization or be
forced to quit their jobs because of pressure.
The organization of workers will inevitably
tend to make the individual employee less significant.
One of the arguments presented by the opposers to
the Act is that the individual loses certain con-
stitutional rights under the policy of the 7/agner
Act, and they point the majority rule of selecting
representatives. Nevertheless, the danger, I
feel, does not lie in the majority rule; the dan-
ger lies in the fact that the organized movement
means that leaders are necessary. In other words,
the Wagner Act may have the effect of regimenting
employees into few groups with leaders at the head
of each; the several leaders will battle for su-
premacy and hence, the results will be detrimental
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to employees in general. The danger of such re-
gimentation is ever-present, naturally, hut hardly
probable it seems.
We cannot deny that the government, labor
organizations and employers are fighting for or
against collective bargaining. On one side is the
government and labor organizations; on the other
side is organized and individual employers. Re-
gardless of which side is victorious, adjustments
in the labor practices and labor policies of both
groups are inevitable. I am wondering whether
the period of adjustment will benefit or harm the
employees. Just what that period will do to em-
ployees is merely guess work; the effects will
be felt by employees and the immediate and ulti-
mate results may be either beneficial or detri-
mental to them. It reminds me of two parties
battling for something at the expense of the third
party.
Since we all agree, generally speaking, that
the objectives of the Wagner Act are desired from
the standpoint of all concerned whether the
Wagner Act can accomplish them entirely is not the
question we can conclude that the immediate
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and ultimate effects of the Wagner Act, in part at
least, will be to the benefit of employees in general.
f
The effects of the Wagner Act on labor organi-
zations have already been implied. In the first
place, because employers will do everything to dis-
courage their employees to join labor organizations,
the organizations will not make very rapid progress
in organizing employees, especially those in the
mass production industries. The efforts of the
employers, with a certain degree of success, will
make the immediate results of the Wagner Act a
disappointment to organized labor. In fact, the
employers' improvement of their practices will make
it more difficult for labor organizations to or-
ganize into trade unions.
The ultimate effects of the Wagner Act will be
very different and very much to the liking of
organized labor. Company unions have concerned
themselves primarily with the adjustment of indi-
vidual grievances. But sooner or later bargaining
over wages, hours and working conditions is bound
to develop. Bargaining over such issues will re-
sult in a pronounced impetus to organized labor.
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Employees vail demand expert representation to
bargain for them which will mean that they will be
practically forced to join trade unions; further-
more, officers of company-unions will recommend
employees to join trade unions. Thus, while the
principal immediate effect of the government’s
policy will be the unintended one of improving a
personnel administration and thereby increasing the
obstacles in the path of many trade unions, ulti-
mately the policy may be expected to produce a
growth in union membership and a spread of collect-
ive bargaining.
However, not all labor leaders are as optimistic
over the future of trade unions. One of the con-
sequences of the government’s labor policy is to in-
crease the dependence of the trade unions upon the
government. The authority of the National Labor
Relations Board to settle disputes over the bargain-
ing unit, may give it much influence upon the out-
come of the struggle between company and industrial
unions and upon the structure of the American labor
movement. Obviously, the farther the government
goes in compelling employers to deal with labor or-
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ganizations, the farther the government will have
to extend Its supervision over them. Certainly if
the government requires employers to bargain with
whatever organization a majority of the employees
select, it will be forced to insist that the orga-
nization meet definite standards of fitness.
Furthermore, it is illogical for the government to
encourage the making of agreements without standing
ready at the request of either side to enforce them.
"These possibilities are alarming to some labor
leaders, for the American Federation of Labor has
traditionally been a stronghold of the ’laissez-
faire’ philosophy. These leaders fear that the
dependence of labor on the government will mean
eventually the end of the free trade union, that
unions will gradually evolve into quasi -public a-
gencies, subject to government regulation and con-
trol, that they will become instruments for carrying
out government policies, and that they will lose
their effectiveness as defenders of the rights and
liberties of the workman. The tendency of labor
organizations to lose their freedom and to become
creatures of the state is said to be world-wide,
and the Wagner Act is regarded as evidence that it
is reaching the United States.” (10)
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Such a far-reaching effect, one which I am
sure we will not live to experience, tints the
imagination with the idea that the United States
is gradually evolving into a communistic form of
government
.
I would rather stick to the conclusion that
the Wagner Act will "bring results beneficial to
labor organizations and employees, and a better
cooperation between organized labor and management.
There are two other important effects that
must be considered which will result from the
Wagner Act. One is an economic effect while the
other one is a psychological effect. The important
economic effect of the Wagner Act is that it will
tend to make wages more rigid or less flexible. To
realize how true the statement is, we must decide
how the practice of collective bargaining will
effect the stability of industry and the problems
of controlling booms and depressions. In order
to realize its objectives, the Wagner Act stresses
the scheme of collective bargaining. When col-
lective bargaining results in wage agreements, it
becomes a method by which the price of labor is
kept for the period of the agreement; thus, it is
a special form of price-fixing.
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Economists are fearful of all kinds of price
fixing because they know that prices need to be
free to move in order to keep industry adjusted to
a constantly changing world. "When prices are not
free, the adjustment takes the form of fluctuations
in production and employment. The disastrous con-
sequences of too rigid wage rates may be illustrated
by their effect upon the violence of business cycles.
Booms and depressions may be regarded as fluctuations
in the rate of change and growth. New methods, new
plants, and new machines are in constant competition
with the old. A depression, therefore, may be re-
garded as a period in which the rate of change and
growth is abnormally slow, and a boom as a period
in which the rate of change and growth is unusually
fast". (11) Consequently, the stabilization of pro-
duction and employment requires, among other things,
that fluctuations be introduced into the cost of
change "that when change occurs too rapidly,
the cost of change must be raised and when it occurs
too slowly, it must be stimulated by cutting the cost
of change. Hence, it is scarcely possible to in-
troduce important fluctuations in the cost of change
without introducing fluctuations in wages. In this
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respect, collective bargaining is likely to prove
useful in causing wages to rise promptly during
periods of boom and thus in preventing the rate of
growth from becoming so rapid that it cannot be
maintained. In periods of depression, however,
collective bargaining is likely to keep wages
pegged at boom levels and thus intensify and pro-
long the slum.
”To conclude the effect of collective bargain-
ing, it seems likely that the spread of collective
bargaining will increase the rigidity of wages.
Since under a capitalistic system, rigid prices
are incompatible with stable production, the grow-
ing rigidity of wages and many other costs seems
destined to produce basic changes in our economic
institutions.” (12)
The psychological effect of the Wagner Act is
obvious and is related to the constitutionality of
the Act. A few years ago there would have been no
doubt that the Act violated certain principles of
the American Constitution. Decisions by the Supreme
Court before 1926 seem to uphold the belief that the
Act is invalid. However, since the Supreme Court
decided in favor of the Railway Labor Act of 1926,
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there is the suggestion and possibility that it is
ready to uphold the Wagner Act. In dealing with
this case, we must remember that the Supreme Court
will be charged with tremendous emotion; millions
of workers will be on edge to learn whether in this
day of gigantic corporations, the Constitution for-
bids the federal government to protect workers in
their right to organize and bargain collectively.
With such pressure on the Supreme Court, it may
well be induced to adopt a liberal interpretation
of the Constitution.
In general, the National Labor Relations Act
is not a very bad piece of legislation. It can do
very little harm to the employers who treat their
employees fair; on the other hand, it will give
those employers who exploit their men a chance to
raise the standard of their own labor practices as
well as helping to raise the standard of employees
In general.
From the standpoint of employees, the Act re-
presents a right which they have always needed. It
is a fact that workers have very little say re-
garding wages, hours and conditions of work. If
the workers do not accomplish in getting higher
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wages, shorter hours and better working conditions,
the Wagner Act should at least relieve them of the
fear they have of their employers a fear
that should never exist between employer and employee.'
Labor organizations have failed dismally in
some of their undertakings and whether or not we can
entrust them to accomplish the objectives set forth
by the policy of the Wagner Act is probable and yet,
questionable. If more labor organizations are what
we need to bring about a better employer-employee
relationship, however, then let us have more of them.’
If we agree that the Wagner Act has and will
continue to have favorable effects on all parties
concerned, then we can also conclude that such effects





The preceding chapters have covered the National
Labor Pielations Act quite thoroughly. In the first
chapter, we have shown that the Wagner Act is not
the first attempt on the part of the government to
interfere with labor relations. On the other hand,
the Wagner Act is the third attempt of the govern-
ment to put into effect the policy of the Wagner Act.
The Act is really the result of the weaknesses,
flaws, ambiguity and excessive generalities of pre-
ceding laws.
In the second chapter, the 1/Vagner Act has been
analyzed. Based on the assumptions that employees
are denied their rights, that employees have an in-
equality of bargaining power compared with their
employers, and that collective bargaining is the
way to shorter hours, higher wages and better con-
ditions of work, the Act is intended, in the first
place, to protect the workers in their right of as-
sociation against the interference of their employers
or the latters* agents. In this respect, the Act is
properly based but it is unfortunate that it does not
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protect employees in their right of association a-
gainst the interference of their fellow-workers or
scrupulous labor organizations. In the second
place, the Act is intended to force employers to
bargain collectively and to enter into agreements
with their employees. The Act has set up a labor
tribunal to force employers into v/hat may be
termed "compulsory arbitration”, and in this re-
spect, it is unfortunate that the government must
be guilty of discrimination against employers.
The Act is too one-sided; in favor of the employees
and labor organizations, and against the employers.
The tribunal, the National Labor Relations Board,
has been vested with enough power to make its orders
effective and its results will reflect on how suc-
cessful government interference with industrial
relations can be.
The third chapter of this thesis presents the
arguments in favor of and in opposition to the
Wagner Act. Briefly, employees and labor organi-
zations stand solidly in favor of the Act; business
or industry stands generally opposed to the Act.
Society can enjoy the results of both groups con-
ditionally; if the Wagner Act increases labor dis-
putes, as some believe it will, society will suffer.
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the loss; but if the Act succeeds in bringing a-
bout a better employee -employer relationship, then
society will certainly be benefited.
The major problem now facing the Act is t'he
question of its constitutionality. There are
certain legal precedents on which the Act is based.
There are -many more Supreme Court decisions that
make the validity of the Act doubtful. The Act
is vulnerable to constitutional attack on several
grounds. Employers state that the Act violates
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. The due-
process of law point, the problem of interstate
commerce and the unwarranted delegation of powers
by Congress in the Labor Board are the important
issues involved in the constitutionality of the
Act. It is almost certain that the Court will not
declare the whole Act unconstitutional but it may
limit the application of the law to such an extent
as to practically nullify it. The Act has already
been declared unconstitutional in a federal court.
The question before the Supreme Court is whether
the Act violates constitutional rights of persons
or whether there is some social and economic justi-

-138 -
flcation for such violations and for the Act itself.
Although the Act is intended to organize em-
ployees and increase collective bargaining, the im-
mediate effect is to do just the opposite; employers,
opposing the organization of workers and the scheme
of collective bargaining, are bending their efforts
against the government’s labor policy. The efforts
of the employers are resulting in a higher standard
for the onployees in general and are obstacles to
the organized labor movement. The ultimate effect
of the Act will be to the benefit of labor organi-
zations who will gain gradual ground when employees
realize that they are not quite capable of dealing
with their employers when wages, hours and condi-
tions of work are at stake.
From a personal point of view, the Act does not
appear to be as bad as some employers seem to think
it is. It certainly is not a panacea as organised
labor would have us believe. While the Act is fal-
lacious in certain respects and subject to criticism,
it seems to be, on the whole, a sound piece of
legislation. I think of the Act as a "pressure"
from the government for employers to treat their
workers fairer and more reasonable and to refrain
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from labor practices that are detrimental not only
to individuals but also to society. I will not
admit, as organized labor believes and the Wagner
Act assumes, that the majority of employers ex-
ploit their workers. There are such employers and
always will be but they are in the minority. To
the employers who bear a mutual understanding with
their employees, the '.Vagner Act can only foster a
closer relationship between both groups. The Act,
however, tends t o make "chiselers” reverse their
labor practices, and in this connection, certainly
the Wagner Act cannot be bad?
I have no objections to the philosophy of the
Act, to the objectives of the Act, the National
Labor Relations Board as set up by the Act, to the
majority rule and to the scheme of collective bar-
gaining. The objection lies in the fact that
there is a power present to make or force one party,
usually the employer, to enter into agreements with
another party or organization. In a nation like
the United States, very little can be accomplished
by force or coercion. Perhaps, the reason lies in
the fact that we are such a heterogeneous group.
We tried forcibly to prohibit drinking by the
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adoption of the Volstead Act; our efforts to prevent
theft have proved just as futile; the results are
most disappointing. Perhaps, we owe our failure to
the means we use to prohibit some from drinking and
prevent others from stealing; certainly we could
try more effective means.'
The point is that the Wagner Act endeavors to
force people, and just how successful it will be
is questionable. In this respect, it will depend
on the attitudes developed among the various groups
concerned. It will be unfortunate if labor rigidly
insists upon the full measure of its legal rights
under the lav;. It will be equally unfortunate if
employers oppose the application of the Act by
legalistic and devious tactics. The workability
and success of the Act will depend, it seems, on
how both sides are ready to make adjustments to
the policy of the Act, and how successful the
National Labor Relations Board is in developing a
proper point of view toward the statute on the
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To diminish the causes of labor disputes burdening or obstructing interstate and
foreign commerce, to create a National Labor Relations Board, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled
,
FINDINGS AND POLICY
Section 1 . The denial by employers of the right of employees to
organize and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of
collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial
strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of
burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the efficiency,
safety, or operation of the instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occur-
ring in the current of commerce; (c) materially affecting, restraining,
or controlling the flow of raw materials or manufactured or processed
goods from or into the channels of commerce, or the prices of such
materials or goods in commerce; or (d) causing diminution of
employment and wages in such volume as substantially to impair or
disrupt the market for goods flowing from or into the channels
of commerce.
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do
not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract,
and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of
ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow
of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions,
by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners
in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage
rates and working conditions within and between industries.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards com-
merce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the
flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of indus-
trial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences
as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring
equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free
flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions
when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure
of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers
of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating




Sec. 2. When used in this Act
—
(1) The term “ person ” includes one or more individuals, part-
nerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees,
trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers.
(2) The term “ employer ” includes any person acting in the
interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include
the United States, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or
any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time
to time, or any labor organization (other than when acting as an
employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of
such labor organization.
(3) The term “employee” shall include any employee, and shall
not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the
Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with,
any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice,
and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equiv-
alent employment, but shall not include any individual employed
as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family
or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent
or spouse.
(4) The term “ representatives ” includes any individual or labor
organization.
(5) The term “ labor organization ” means any organization of
any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or
plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the pur-
pose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employ-
ment, or conditions of work.
(G) The term “commerce” means trade, traffic, commerce, trans-
portation, or communication among the several States, or between
the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States
and any State or other Territory, or between any foreign country
and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or within
the District of Columbia or any Territory, or between points in the
same State but through any other State or any Territory or the
District of Columbia or any foreign country.
(7) The term “affecting commerce” means in commerce, or bur-
dening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or
having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or
obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.
(8) The term “unfair labor practice” means any unfair labor
practice listed in section 8.
(9) The term “ labor dispute ” includes any controversy concerning
terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the associ-
ation or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintain-
ing, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employ-
ment., regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee.
(10) The term “National Labor Relations Board” means the
National Labor Relations Board created by section 3 of this Act.
(11) The term “old Board ” means the National Labor Relations
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Board established by Executive Order Numbered 6763 of the Presi-
dent on June 29, 1934, pursuant to Public Resolution Numbered 44,
approved June 19, 1934 (48 Stat. 1183), and reestablished and con-
tinued by Executive Order Numbered 7074 of the President of
June 15, 1935, pursuant to Title I of the National Industrial Recov-
ery Act (48 Stat. 195) as amended and continued by Senate Joint
Resolution 133 1 approved June 14, 1935.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Sec. 3. (a) There is hereby created a board, to be known as the
“ National Labor Relations Board ” (hereinafter referred to as
(fhe “Board”), which shall be composed of three members, who
shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. One of the original members shall be
appointed for a term of one year, one for a term of three years, and
one for a term of five years, but their successors shall be appointed
for terms of five years each, except that any individual chosen to
fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the unexpired term of
the member whom he shall succeed. The President shall designate
one member to serve as chairman of the Board. Any member of
the Board may be removed by the President, upon notice and hear-
ing, for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no other
cause.
(b) A vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right of the
remaining members to exercise all the powers of the Board, and
two members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum.
The Board shall have an official seal which shall be judicially noticed.
(c) The Board shall at the close of each fiscal year make a report
in writing to Congress and to the President stating in detail the
cases it has heard, the decisions it has rendered, the names, salaries,
and duties of all employees and officers in the employ or under the
supervision of the Board, and an account of all moneys it has
disbursed.
Sec. 4. (a) Each member of the Board shall receive a salary of
$10,000 a year, shall be eligible for reappointment, and shall not
engage in any other business, vocation, or employment. The Board
shall appoint, without regard for the provisions of the civil-service
laws but subject to the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, an
executive secretary, and such attorneys, examiners, and regional
directors, and shall appoint such other employees with regard to
existing laws applicable to the employment and compensation of
officers and employees of the United States, as it may from time
to time find necessary for the proper performance of its duties and
as may be from time to time appropriated for by Congress. The
Board may establish or utilize such regional, local, or other agencies,
and utilize such voluntary and uncompensated services, as may from
time to time be needed. Attorneys appointed under this section
may, at the direction of the Board, appear for and represent the
Board in any case in court. Nothing in this Act shall be construed
to authorize the Board to appoint individuals for the purpose of
conciliation or mediation (or for statistical work), where such
service may be obtained from the Department of Labor.
(b) Upon the appointment of the three original members of the
Board and the designation of its chairman, the old Board shall cease
1 So in original.
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to exist. All employees of the old Board shall be transferred to
and become employees of the Board with salaries under the Classi-
fication Act of 1923, as amended, without acquiring by such transfer
a permanent or civil service status. All records, papers, and prop-
erty of the old Board shall become records, papers, and property
of the Board, and all unexpended funds and appropriations for the
use and maintenance of the old Board shall become funds and appro-
priations available to be expended by the Board in the exercise of
the powers, authority, and duties conferred on it by this Act.
(c) All of the expenses of the Board, including all necessary
traveling and subsistence expenses outside the District of Columbia
incurred by the members or employees of the Board under its orders,
shall be allowed and paid on the presentation of itemized vouchers
therefor approved by the Board or by any individual it designates
for that purpose.
Sec. 5. The principal office of the Board shall be in the District
of Columbia, but it may meet and exercise any or all of its powers
at any other place. The Board may, by one or more of its members
or by such agents or agencies as it may designate, prosecute any
inquiry necessary to its functions in any part of the United States.
A member who participates in such an inquiry shall not be dis-
qualified from subsequently participating in a decision of the Board
in the same case.
Sec. C. (a) The Board shall have authority from time to time
to make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act. Such rules and
regulations shall be effective upon publication in the manner which
the Board shall prescribe.
RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES
Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection.
Sec. 8. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
—
(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.
(2) To dominate or interfere with the formation or adminis-
tration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other
support to it:' Provided
,
That subject to rules and regulations made
and published by the Board pursuant to section (> (a), an employer
shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with
him during working hours without loss of time or pay.
(3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization : Provided , That nothing
in this Act, or in the National Industrial Recovery Act (U. S. C.,
Supp. VII, title 15, secs. 701-712), as amended from time to time,
or in any code or agreement approved or prescribed thereunder, or
in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer
from making an agreement with a labor organization (not estab-
lished, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this Act
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as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employ-
ment membership therein, if such labor organization is the repre-
sentative of the employees as provided in section 9 (a), in the appro-
priate collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when
made.
(4) To discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee
because he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act.
(5)
To refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of
his employees, subject to the provisions of Section 9 (a).
REPRESENTATIVES AND ELECTIONS
Sec. 9. (a) Representatives designated or selected for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in
a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive repre-
sentatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment : Provided
,
That
any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the
right at any time to present grievances to their employer.
(b) The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to
insure to employees the full benefit of their right to self-organiza-
tion and to collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the
policies of this Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or
subdivision thereof.
(c) Whenever a question affecting commerce arises concerning
the representation of employees, the Board may investigate such
controversy and certify to the parties, in writing, the name or
names of the representatives that have been designated or selected.
In any such investigation, the Board shall provide for an appro-
priate hearing upon due notice, either in conjunction with a proceed-
ing under section 10 or otherwise, and may take a secret ballot of
employees, or utilize any other suitable method to ascertin 1 such
representatives.
(d) Whenever an order of the Board made pursuant to section
10 (c) is based in whole or in part upon facts certified following
an investigation pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, and
there is a petition for the enforcement or review of such order, such
certification and the record of such investigation shall be included
in the transcript of the entire record required to be filed under sub-
sections 10 (e) or 10 (f), and thereupon the decree of the court
enforcing, modifying, or setting aside in whole or in part the order
of the Board shall be made and entered upon the pleadings, testi-
mony, and proceedings set forth in such transcript.
prevention of unfair labor practices
Sec. 10. (a) The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided,
to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice
(listed in section 8) affecting commerce. This power shall be
exclusive, and shall not be affected by any other means of adjust-
ment or prevention that has been or may be established by agree-
ment, code, law, or otherwise.
(b) Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is
engaging in any such unfair labor practice, the Board, or any
1 So in original.
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agent or agency designated by the Board for such purposes, shall
have power to issue and canse to be served upon such person a com-
plaint stating the charges in that respect, and containing a notice
of hearing liefore the Board or a member thereof, or before a desig-
nated agent or agency, at a place therein fixed, not less than five days
after the serving of said complaint. Any such complaint may be
amended by the member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing
or the Board in its discretion at any time prior to the issuance of
an order based thereon. The person so complained of shall have
the right to file an answer to the original or amended complaint
and to appear in person or otherwise and give testimony at the
place and time fixed in the complaint. In the discretion of the
member, agent or agency conducting the hearing or the Board, any
other person may be allowed to intervene in the said proceeding
and to present testimony. In any such proceeding the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling.
(c) The testimony taken by such member, agent or agency or
the Board shall be reduced to writing and filed with the Board.
Thereafter, in its discretion, the Board upon notice may take fur-
ther testimony or hear argument. If upon all the testimony taken
the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the
complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor
practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall
issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring
such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice,
and to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of
employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies
of this Act. Such order may further require such person to make
reports from time to time showing the extent to which it has com-
plied with the order. If upon all the testimony taken the Board
shall be of the opinion that no person named in the complaint has
engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then
the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue an order
dismissing the said complaint.
(d) Until a transcript of the record in a case shall have been
filed in a court, as hereinafter provided, the Board may at any
time, upon reasonable notice and in such manner as it shall deem
proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any finding or
order made or issued by it.
(e) The Board shall have power to petition any circuit court
of appeals of the United States (including the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia), or if all the circuit courts of appeals
to which application may be made are in vacation, any district
court of the United States (including the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia), within any circuit or district, respectively,
wherein the unfair labor practice in question occurred or wherein
such person resides or transacts business, for the enforcement of
such order and for appropriate temporary relief or restraining
order, and shall certify and file in the court a transcript of the
entire record in the proceeding, including the pleadings and testi-
mony upon which such order was entered and the findings and
order of the Board. Upon such filing, the court shall cause notice
thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall have
jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question determined
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therein, and shall have power to grant such temporary relief or
restraining order as it deems just and proper, and to make and
enter upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth in
such transcript a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as
so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the
Board. No objection that has not been urged before the Board, its
member, agent or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless
the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because
of extraordinary circumstances. The findings of the Board as to
the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive. If either
party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evi-
dence and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such addi-
tional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds
for the failure to adduce such evidence in the hearing before the
Board, its member, agent, or agency, the court may order such
additional evidence to be taken before the Board, its member, agent,
or agency, and to be made a part of the transcript. The Board may
modify its findings as to the facts, or make new findings, by reason
of additional evidence so taken and filed, and it shall file such modi-
fied or new findings, which, if supported by evidence, shall be con-
clusive, and shall file its recommendations, if any, for the modifica-
tion or setting aside of its original order. The jurisdiction of the
court shall be exclusive and its judgment and decree shall be final,
except that the same shall be subject to review by the appropriate
circuit court of appeals if application was made to the district court
as hereinabove provided, and by the Supreme Court of the United
States upon writ of certiorari or certification as provided in sections
231) and 240 of the Judicial Code, as amended (U. S. C., title 28,
secs. 346 and 347).
(f) Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting
or denying in whole or in part the relief sough! may obtain a review
of such order in any circuit court of appeals of the Uniled Slates in
tho circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged
to have been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transacts
business, or in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, by
filing in such court a written petition praying that the order of the
Board be modified or set aside. A copy of such petition shall be
forthwith served upon the Board, and thereupon I he aggrieved party
shall file in the court a transcript of the entire record in the proceed-
ing, certified by the Board, including the pleading and testimony
upon which the order complained of was entered and the findings
and order of the Board. Upon such filing, the court shall proceed
in the same manner as in the case of an application by the Board
under subsection (e), and shall have the same exclusive jurisdiction
to grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it
deems just and proper, and in like manner to make and enter a decree
enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside
in whole or in part the order of the Board
;
and the findings of the
Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall in like manner
be conclusive.
(g) The commencement of proceedings under subsection (e) or (f
)
of this section shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court,
operate as a stay of the Board’s order.
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(h) When granting appropriate temporary relief or a restraining
order, or making and entering a decree enforcing, modifying, and
enforcing as so modified or setting aside in whole or in part an order
of the Board, as provided in this section, the jurisdiction of courts
sitting in equity shall not be limited by the Act entitled “An Act to
amend the Judicial Code and to define and limit the jurisdiction of
courts sitting in equity, and for other purposes ”, approved March
23, 1932 (U. S. C., Supp. VII, title 29, secs. 101-115).
(i) Petitions filed under this Act shall be heard expeditiously, and
if possible within ten days after they have been docketed.
INVESTIGATORY POWERS
Sec. 11. For the purpose of all hearings and investigations, which,
in the opinion of the Board, are necessary and proper for the exercise
of the powers vested in it by section 9 and section 10
—
(1) The Board, or its duly authorized agents or agencies, shall at
all reasonable times have access to, for the purpose of examination,
and the right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated
or proceeded against that relates to any matter under investigation or
in question. Any member of the Board shall have power to issue
subpenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and
the production of any evidence that relates to any matter under inves-
tigation or in question, before the Board, its member, agent, or agency
conducting the hearing or investigation. Any member of the Board,
or any agent or agency designated by the Board for such purposes,
may administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and receive
evidence. Such attendance of witnesses and the production of such
evidence may be required from any place in the United States or any
Territory or possession thereof, at any designated place of hearing.
(2) In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpena issued to
any person, any District Court of the United States or the United
States courts of any Territory or possession, or the Supreme Court
of the District of Columbia, within the jurisdiction of which the
inquiry is carried on or within the jurisdiction of which said person
guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides or trans-
acts business, upon application by the Board shall have jurisdiction
to issue to such person an order requiring such person to appear
before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, there to produce
evidence if so ordered, or there to give testimony touching the matter
under investigation or in question; and any failure to obey such
order of the court may be punished by said court as a contempt
thereof.
(3) No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or
from producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or other
evidence in obedience to the subpena of the Board, on the ground
that the testimony or evidence required of him may tend to incrim-
inate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture; but no indi-
vidual shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture
for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning
which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against
self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that such
individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and
punishment for perjury committed in so testifying.
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(4) Complaints, orders, and other process and papers of the Board,
its member, agent, or agency, may be served either personally or by
registered mail or by telegraph or by leaving a copy thereof at the
principal office or place of business of the person required to be
served. The verified return by the individual so serving the same
setting forth the manner of such service shall be proof of the same,
and the return post office receipt or telegraph receipt therefor when
registered and mailed or telegraphed as aforesaid shall be proof of
service of the same. Witnesses summoned before the Board, its
member, agent, or agency, shall be paid the same fees and mileage
that are paid witnesses in the courts of the United States, and wit-
nesses whose depositions are taken and the persons taking the same
shall severally be entitled to the same fees as are paid for like
services in the courts of the United States.
(5) All process of any court to which application may be made
under this Act may be served in the judicial district wherein the
defendant or other person required to be served resides or may be
found.
(6) The several departments and agencies of the Government,
when directed by the President, shall furnish the Board, upon its
request, all records, papers, and information in their possession
relating to any matter before the Board.
Sec. 12. Any person who shall willfully resist, prevent, impede,
or interfere with any member of the Board or any of its agents or
agencies in the performance of duties pursuant to this Act shall be
punished by a fine of not more than $5,000 or by imprisonment for
not moi’e than one year, or both.
LIMITATIONS
Sec. 13. Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere
with or impede or diminish in any way t he right to strike.
Sec. 14. Wherever the application of the provisions of section
7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act (U. S. C., Supp. VII,
title 15, sec. 707 (a)), as amended from time to time, or of section.
77 B, paragraphs (1) and (in) of the Act approved June 7, 1934,
entitled “An Act to amend an Act entitled ‘An Act to establish a
uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States’
approved July 1
, 1898, and Acts amendatory thereof and supple-
mentary thereto” (48 Stat. 922, pars. (1) and (m)), as amended
from time to time, or of Public Resolution Numbered 44, approved
June 19, 1934 (48 Stat. 1183), conflicts with the application of the
provisions of this Act, this Act shall prevail: Provided
,
That in
any situation where the provisions of this Act cannot be validly
enforced, the provisions of such other Acts shall remain in full
force and effect.
Sec. 15. If any provision of this Act, or the application of such
provision to any person or circumstance, shall be held invalid, the
remainder of this Act, or the application of such provision to per-
sons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid,
shall not be affected thereby.
Sec. 16. This Act may be cited as the “ National Labor Relations
Act.”










To encourage national industrial recover}7
,
to foster fair competition, and to
provide for the construction of certain useful public works, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and Blouse of Representatives of the




Section 1 . A national emergency productive of widespread unem-
ployment and disorganization of industry, which burdens interstate
and foreign commerce, affects the public welfare, and undermines
the standards of living of the American people, is hereby declared
to exist. It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to remove
obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce
which tend to diminish the amount thereof; and to provide for the
general welfare by promoting the organization of industry for the
purpose of cooperative action among trade groups, to induce and
maintain united, action of labor and management under adequate
governmental sanctions and supervision, to eliminate unfair competi-
tive practices, to promote the fullest possible utilization of tho
present productive capacity of industries, to avoid undue restriction
of production (except as may be temporarily required), to increase
the consumption of industrial and agricultural products by increas-
ing purchasing power, to reduce and relieve unemployment, to
improve standards of labor, and otherwise to rehabilitate industry
and to conserve natural resources.
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Sec. 2. (a) To effectuate the policy of this title, the President is
hereby authorized to establish such agencies, to accept and utilize
such voluntary and uncompensated services, to appoint, without
regard to the provisions of the civil service laws, such officers and
employees, and to utilize such Federal officers and employees, and,
with the consent of the State, such State and local officers and em-
ployees, as he may find necessary, to prescribe their authorities,
duties, responsibilities, and tenure, and, without regard to the Classi-
fication Act of 1923, as amended, to fix the compensation of any
officers and employees so appointed.
(b) The President may delegate any of his functions and powers
under this title to such officers, agents, and employees as he may
designate or appoint, and may establish an industrial planning and
research agency to aid in carrying out his functions under this title.
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(c) This title shall cease to be in effect and any agencies established
hereunder shall cease to exist at the expiration of two years after
the date of enactment of this Act, or sooner if the President shall
by proclamation or the Congress shall by joint resolution declare
that the emergency recognized by section 1 has ended.
CODES OF FAIR COMPETITION
Sec. 3. (a) Upon the application to the President by one or more
trade or industrial associations or groups, the President may approve
a code or codes of fair competition for the trade or industry or sub-
division thereof, represented by the applicant or applicants, if the
President finds (1) that such associations or groups impose no
inequitable restrictions on admission to membership therein and are
truly representative of such trades or industries or subdivisions
thereof, and (2) that such code or codes are not designed to pro-
mote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will
not operate to discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate
the policy of this title : Provided
,
That such code or codes shall not
permit monopolies or monopolistic practices : Provided further
,
That where such code or codes affect the services and welfare of
persons engaged in other steps of the economic process, nothing in
this section shall deprive such persons of the right to be heard prior
to approval by the President of such code or codes. The President
may, as a condition of his approval of any such code, impose such
conditions (including requirements for the making of reports and
the keeping of accounts) for the protection of consumers, competi-
tors, employees, and others, and in furtherance of the puolic inter-
est, and may provide such exceptions to and exemptions from the
provisions of such code, as the President in his discretion deems
necessary to effectuate the policy herein declared.
(b) After the President shall have approved any such code, the
provisions of such code shall be the standards of fair competition
for such trade or industry or subdivision thereof. Any violation of
such standards in any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce shall be deemed an unfair method of competition in com-
merce within the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as
amended; but nothing in this title shall be construed to impair the
powers of the Federal Trade Commission under such Act, as
amended.
(c) The several district courts of the United States are hereby
invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of any
code of fair competition approved under this title; and it shall be
the duty of the several district attorneys of the United States, in
their respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney Gen-
eral, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such
violations.
(d) Upon his own motion, or if complaint is made to the President
that abuses inimical to the public interest and contrary to the policy
herein declared are prevalent in any trade or industry or subdivision
thereof, and if no code of fair competition therefor has theretofore
beep approved by the President, the President, after such public
notice and hearing as he shall specify, may prescribe and approve
a code of fair competition for such trade or industry or subdivision
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thereof, which shall have the same effect as a code of fair compe-
tition approved by the President under subsection (a) of this section.
(e) On his own motion, or if any labor organization, or any trade
or industrial organization, association, or group, which has complied
with the provisions of this title, shall make complaint to the President
that any article or articles are being imported into the United States
in substantial quantities or increasing ratio to domestic production
of any competitive article or articles and on such terms or under
such conditions as to render ineffective or seriously to endanger the
maintenance of any code or agreement under this title, the President
may cause an immediate investigation to be made by the United
States Tariff Commission, which shall give precedence to investiga-
tions under this subsection, and if, after such investigation and such
public notice and hearing as he shall specify, the President shall find
the existence of such facts, he shall, in order to effectuate the policy
of this title, direct that the article or articles concerned shall be
permitted entry into the United States only upon such terms and
conditions and subject to the payment of such fees and to such
limitations in the total quantity which may be imported (in the
course of any specified period or periods) as he shall find it necessary
to prescribe in order that the entry thereof shall not render or tend
to render ineffective any code or agreement made under this title. In
order to enforce any limitations imposed on the total quantity of
imports, in any specified period or periods, of any article or articles
under this subsection, the President may forbid the importation of
such article or articles unless the importer shall have first obtained
from the Secretary of the Treasury a license pursuant to such regu-
lations as the President may prescribe. Upon information of any
action by the President under this subsection the Secretary of the
Treasury shall, through the proper officers, permit entry of the
article or articles specified only upon such terms and conditions and
subject to such fees, to such limitations in the quantity which may
be imported, and to such requirements of license, as the President
shall have directed. The decision of the President as to facts shall
be conclusive. Any condition or limitation of entry under this sub-
section shall continue in effect until the President shall find and
inform the Secretary of the Treasury that the conditions which led
to the imposition of such condition or limitation upon entry no
longer exists.
(f) When a code of fair competition has been approved or pre-
scribed by the President under this title, any violation of any pro-
vision thereof in any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce shall be a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof an
offender shall be fined not more than $500 for each offense, and each
day such violation continues shall be deemed a separate offense.
AGREEMENTS AND LICENSES
Sec. 4. (a) The President is authorized to enter into agreements
with, and to approve voluntary agreements between and among, per-
sons engaged in a trade or industry, labor organizations, and trade
or industrial organizations, associations, or groups, relating to any
trade or industry, if in his judgment such agreements will aid in
effectuating the policy of this title with respect to transactions in or
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affecting interstate or foreign commerce, and will be consistent with
the requirements of clause (2) of subsection (a) of section 3 for a
code of fair competition.
(b) Whenever the President shall find that destructive wage or
price cutting or other activities contrary to the policy of this title
are being practiced in any trade or industry or any subdivision
thereof, and, after such public notice and hearing as he shall specify,
shall find it essential to license business enterprises in order to make
effective a code of fair competition or an agreement under this title
or otherwise to effectuate the policy of this title, and shall publicly
so announce, no person shall, after a date fixed in such announce-
ment, engage in or carry on any business, in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce, specified in such announcement, unless he shall
have first obtained a license issued pursuant to such regulations as
the President shall prescribe. The President may suspend or revoke
any such license, after due notice and opportunity for hearing, for
violations of the terms or conditions thereof. Any order of the
President suspending or revoking any such license shall be final if
in accordance with law. Any person who, without such a license
or in violation of any condition thereof, carries on any such busi-
ness for which a license is so required, shall, upon conviction thereof,
be fined not more than $500, or imprisoned not more than six months,
or both, and each day such violation continues shall be deemed a
separate offense. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 2 (c),
this subsection shall cease to be in effect at the expiration of one
year after the date of enactment of this Act or sooner if the Presi-
dent shall by proclamation or the Congress shall by joint resolution
declare that the emergency recognized by section 1 has ended.
Sec. 5. While this title is in effect (or in the case of a license, while
section 4 (a) is in effect) and for sixty days thereafter, any code,
agreement, or license approved, prescribed, or issued and in effect
under this title, and any action complying with the provisions
thereof taken during such period, shall be exempt from the provi-
sions of the antitrust laws of the United States.
Nothing in this Act, and no regulation thereunder, shall pre-
vent an individual from pursuing the vocation of manual labor and
selling or trading the products thereof; nor shall anything in this
Act, or regulation thereunder, prevent anyone from marketing or
trading the produce of his farm.
LIMITATIONS UPON APPLICATION OF TITLE
Sec. 6. (a) No trade or industrial association or group shall be
eligible to receive the benefit of the provisions of this title until it
files with the President a statement containing such information
relating to the activities of the association or group as the President
shall by regulation prescribe.
(b) The President is authorized to prescribe rules and regulations
designed to insure that any organization availing itself of the bene-
fits of this title shall be truly representative of the trade or industry
or subdivision thereof represented by such organization. Any organ-
ization violating any such rule or regulation shall ceaso to be entitled
to the benefits of this title.
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(c) Upon the request of the President, the Federal Trade Com-
mission shall make such investigations as may be necessary to enable
the President to carry out the provisions of this title, and for such
purposes the Commission shall have all the powers vested in it with
respect of investigations under the Federal Trade Commission Act,
as amended.
Sec. 7. (a) Every code of fair competition, agreement, and license
approved, prescribed, or issued under this title shall contain the
following conditions: (1) That employees shall have the right to
organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or
coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of
such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection; (2) that no employee and no one seeking employ-
ment shall be required as a condition of employment to join any
company union or to refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting
a labor organization of his own choosing; and (3) that employers
shall comply with the maximum hours of labor, minimum rates of
pay, and other conditions of employment, approved or prescribed by
the President.
(b) The President shall, so far as practicable, afford every oppor-
tunity to employers and employees in any trade or industry or subdi-
vision thereof with respect to which the conditions referred to in
clauses (1) and (2) of subsection (a) prevail, to establish by mutual
agreement, the standards as to the maximum hours of labor, mini-
mum rates of pay, and such other conditions of employment as may
be necessary in such trade or industry or subdivision thereof to
effectuate the policy of this title; and the standards established in
such agreements, when approved by the President, shall have the
same effect as a code of fair competition, approved by the President
under subsection (a) of section 3.
(c^ Where no such mutual agreement has been approved by the
President he may investigate the labor practices, policies, wages,
hours of labor, and conditions of employment in such trade or
industry or subdivision thereof; and upon the basis of such investi-
gations, and after such hearings as the President finds advisable, he
is authorized to prescribe a limited code of fair competition fixing
such maximum hours of labor, minimum rates of pay, and other
conditions of employment in the trade or industry or subdivision
thereof investigated as he finds to be necessary to effectuate the
policy of this title, which shall have the same effect as a code of fair
competition approved by the President under subsection (a) of
section 3. * The President may differentiate according to experience
and skill of the employees affected and according to the locality of
employment; but no attempt shall be made to introduce any classi-
fication according to the nature of the work involved which might
tend to set a maximum as well as a minimum wage.
(d) As used in this title, the term “person” includes any indi-
vidual, partnership, association, trust, or corporation
;
and the terms
“ interstate and foreign commerce ” and “ interstate or foreign com-
merce ” include, except where otherwise indicated, trade or commerce
among the several States and with foreign nations, or between the
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District of Columbia or any Territory of tlie United States and any
State, Territory, or foreign nation, or between any insular posses-
sions or other places under the jurisdiction of the United States, or
between any such possession or place and any State or Territory of
the United States or the District of Columbia or any foreign nation,
or within the District of Columbia or any Territory or any insular
possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States.
APPLICATION OF AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT
Sec. 8. (a) This title shall not be construed to repeal or modify
any of the provisions of title I of the Act entitled “An Act to relieve
the existing national economic emergency by increasing agricultural
purchasing power, to raise revenue lor extraordinary expenses
incurred by reason of such emergency, to provide emergency relief
with respect to agricultural indebtedness, to provide for the orderly
liquidation of joint-stock land banks, and for other purposes’,
approved May 12, 1933; and such title I of said Act approved May
12, 1933, may for all purposes be hereafter referred to as the
“Agricultural Adjustment Act.”
(b) The President may, in his discretion, in order to avoid con-
flicts in the administration of the Agricultural Adjustment Act and
this title, delegate any of his functions and powers under this title
with respect to trades, industries, or subdivisions thereof which are
engaged in the handling of any agricultural commodity or product
thereof, or of any competing commodity or product thereof, to the
Secretary of Agriculture.
OIL REGULATION
Sec. 9. (a) The President is further authorized to initiate before
the Interstate Commerce Commission proceedings necessary to pre-
scribe regulations to control the operations of oil pipe lines and to
fix reasonable, compensatory rates for the transportation of petro-
leum and its products by pipe lines, and the Interstate Commerce
Commission shall grant preference to the hearings and determina-
tion of such cases.
(b) The President is authorized to institute proceedings to divorce
from any holding company any pipe-line company controlled by
such holding company which pipe-line company by unfair practices
or by exorbitant rates in the transportation of petroleum or its
products tends to create a monopoly.
(c) The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in
interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products
thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount
permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State
law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board,
commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State. Any
violation of any order of the President issued under the provisions
of this subsection shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $1,000,
^or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or both.
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Sec. 10. (a) The President is authorized to prescribe such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of
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this title, and fees for licenses and for fding codes of fair competi-
tion and agreements, and any violation of any such rule or regula-
tion shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $500, or imprison-
ment for not to exceed six months, or both.
(b) The President may from time to time cancel or modify any
order, approval, license, rule, or regulation issued under this title;
and each agreement, code of fair competition, or license approved,
prescribed, or issued under this title shall contain an express pro-
vision to that effect.
TITLE II—PUBLIC WORKS AND CONSTRUCTION
PROJECTS
FEDERAL E3IERGENCT ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC WORKS
Section 201. (a) To effectuate the purposes of this title, the
President is hereby authorized to create a Federal Emergency
Administration of Public Works, all the powers of which shall bo
exercised by a Federal Emergency Administrator of Public Works
(hereafter referred to as the “Administrator”), and to establish
such agencies, to accept and utilize such voluntary and uncompen-
sated services, to appoint, without regard to the civil service laws,
such officers and employees, and to utilize such Federal officers and
employees, and, with the consent of the State, such State and local
officers and employees as he may find necessary, to prescribe their
authorities, duties, responsibilities, and tenure, and, without regard
to the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to fix the compensation
of any officers and employees so appointed. The President may dele-
gate any of his functions and powers under this title to such officers,
agents, and employees as he may designate or appoint.
(b) The Administrator may, without regard to the civil service
laws or the Classification Act of 1923, os amended, appoint and
fix the compensation of such experts and such other officers and
employees as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this
title; and may make such expenditures (including expenditures for
personal sendees and rent at the seat of government and elsewhere,
for law books and books of reference, and for paper, printing and
binding) as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this title.
(c) All such compensation, expenses, and allowances shall be
paid out of funds made available by this Act.
(d) After the expiration of two years after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, or sooner if the President shall by proclama-
tion or the Congress shall by joint resolution declare that the emer-
gency recognized by section 1 has ended, the President shall not
make any further loans or grants or enter upon any new construc-
tion under this title, and any agencies established hereunder shall
cease to exist and any of their remaining functions shall be trans-
ferred to such departments of the Government as the President shall
designate : Provided
,
That he may issue funds to a borrower under
this title prior to January 23, 1939, under the terms of any agree-
ment, or any commitment to bid upon or purchase bonds, entered
into with such borrower prior to the date of termination, under this
section, of the power of the President to make loans.
Sec. 202. The Administrator, under the direction of the President,
shall prepare a comprehensive program of public works, which shall
include among other things the following: (a) Construction, repair,
and improvement of public highways and park ways, public build-
ings, and any publicly owned instrumentalities and facilities; (b)
conservation and development of natural resources, including con-
trol, utilization, and purification of waters, prevention of soil or
coastal erosion, development of water power, transmission of elec-
trical energy, and construction of river and harbor improvements
and flood control and also the construction of any river or drainage
improvement required to perform or satisfy any obligation incurred
by the United States through a treaty with a foreign Government
heretofore ratified and to restore or develop for the use of any State
or its citizens water taken from or denied to them by performance
on the part of the United States of treaty obligations heretofore
assumed : Provided
,
That no river or harbor improvements shall be
carried out unless they shall have heretofore or hereafter been
adopted by the Congress or are recommended by the Chief of Engi-
neers of the United States Army; (c) any projects of the character
heretofore constructed or carried on either directly by public author-
ity or with public aid to serve the interests of the general public;
(d) construction, reconstruction, alteration, or repair under public
regulation or control of low-cost housing and slum-clearance proj-
ects; (e) any project (other than those included in the foregoing
classes) of any character heretofore eligible for loans under sub-
section (a) of section 201 of the Emergency Relief and Construction
Act of 1932, as amended, and paragraph (3) of such subsection (a)
shall for such purposes be held to include loans for the construction
or completion of hospitals the operation of which is partly financed
from public funds, and of reservoirs and pumping plants and for
the construction of dry docks
;
and if in the opinion of the President
it seems desirable, the construction of naval vessels within the terms
and/or limits established by the London Naval Treaty of 1930 and
of aircraft required therefor and construction of heavier-than-air
aircraft and technical construction for the Army Air Corps and
such Army housing projects as the President may approve, and
provision of original equipment for the mechanization or motor-




That in the event of an international agreement for the
further limitation of armament, to which the United States is
signatory, the President is hereby authorized and empowered to
suspend, in whole or in part, any such naval or military construction
or mechanization and motorization of Army units: Provided fur-
ther
j
That this title shall not be applicable to public works under
the jurisdiction or control of the Architect of the Capitol or of any
commission or committee for which such Architect is the contracting
and/or executive officer.
Sec. 203. (a) With a view to increasing employment quickly (while
reasonably securing any loans made by the United States) the Presi-
dent is authorized and empowered, through the Administrator or
through such other agencies as he may designate or create, (1) to con-
struct, finance, or aid in the construction or financing of any public-
works project included in the program prepared pursuant to section
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202; (2) upon such terms as the President shall prescribe, to make
grants to States, municipalities, or other public bodies for the con-
struction, repair, or improvement of any such project, but no such
grant shall be in excess of 30 per centum of the cost of the labor and
materials employed upon such project; (3) to acquire by purchase, or
b}? exercise of the power of eminent domain, any real or personal
property in connection with the construction of any such project,
and to sell any security acquired or any property so constructed or
acquired or to lease any such property with or without the privilege
of purchase : Provided
,
That all moneys received from any such sale
or lease or the repayment of any loan shall be used to retire obliga-
tions issued pursuant to section 209 of this Act, in addition to any
other moneys required to be used for such purpose; (4) to aid in
the financing of such railroad maintenance and equipment as may
be approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission as desirable
for the improvement of transportation facilities; and (5) to advance,
upon request of the Commission having jurisdiction of the project,
the unappropriated balance of the sum authorized for carrying out
the provisions of the Act entitled “ An Act to provide for the
construction and equipment of an annex to the Library of Con-
gress ”, approved June 13, 1930 (46 Stat. 583)
;
such advance to be
expended under the direction of such Commission and in accordance
with such Act : Provided
,
That in deciding to extend any aid or
grant hereunder to any State, county, or municipality the President
may consider whether action is in process or in good faith assured
therein reasonably designed to bring the ordinary current expendi-
tures thereof within the prudently estimated revenues thereof. The
provisions of this section and section 202 shall extend to public
works in the several States, Hawaii, Alaska, the District of Colum-
bia, Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, and the Virgin Islands.
(b) All expenditures for authorized travel by officers and
employees, including subsistence, required on account of any Federal
public-works projects, shall be charged to the amounts allocated to
such projects, notwithstanding any other provisions of law
;
and
there is authorized to be emplo3’ed such personal services in the
District of Columbia and elsewhere as may be required to be engaged
upon such work and to be in addition to employees otherwise pro-
vided for, the compensation of such additional personal services to
be a charge against the funds made available for such construction
work.
(c) In the acquisition of any land or site for the purposes of
Federal public buildings and in the construction of such buildings
provided for in this title, the provisions contained in sections 305
and 306 of the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932, as
amended, shall apply.
(d) The President, in his discretion, and under such terms as
he may prescribe, may extend any of the benefits of this title to any
State, county, or municipality notwithstanding any constitutional
or legal restriction or limitation on the right or power of such State,
county, or municipality to borrow money or incur indebtedness.
Sec. 204. (a) For the purpose of providing for emergency con-
struction of public highways and related projects, the President is
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authorized to make grants to the highway departments of the several
States in an amount not less than $400,000,000, to be expended by
such departments in accordance with the provisions of the Federal
Highway Act, approved November 9, 1921, as amended and supple-
mented, except as provided in this title, as follows
:
(1) For expenditure in emergency construction on the Federal
aid highway system and extensions thereof into and through munici-
palities. The amount apportioned to any State under this paragraph
may be used to pay all or any part of the cost of surveys, plans, and
of highway and bridge construction including the elimination of
hazards to highway traffic, such as the separation of grades at cross-
ing, the reconstruction of existing railroad grade crossing structures,
the relocation of highways to eliminate railroad crossings, the widen-
ing of narrow bridges and roadways, the building of footpaths,
the replacement of unsafe bridges, the construction of routes to
avoid congested areas, the construction of facilities to improve
accessibility and the free flow of traffic, and the cost of any other
construction that will provide safer traffic facilities or definitely
eliminate existing hazards to pedestrian or vehicular traffic. No
funds made available by this title shall be used for the acquisition
of any land, right of way, or easement in connection with any rail-
road grade elimination project.
(2) For expenditure in emergency construction on secondary or
feeder roads to be agreed upon by the State highway departments
and the Secretary of Agriculture : Provided
,
That the State or
responsible political subdivision shall provide for the proper main-
tenance of said roads. Such grants shall be available for payment
of the full cost of surveys, plans, improvement, and construction of
secondary or feeder roads, on which projects shall be submitted by
the State highway department and approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture.
(b) Any amounts allocated by the President for grants under
subsection (a) of this section shall be apportioned among the several
States seven-eighths in accordance with the provisions of section
21 of the Federal Highway Act, approved November 9, 1921, as
amended and supplemented (which Act is hereby further amended
for the purposes of this title to include the District of Columbia),
and one-eighth in the ratio which the population of each State
bears to the total population of the United States, according to the
latest decennial census and shall be available on July 1, 1933, and
shall remain available until expended; but no part of the funds
apportioned to any State need be matched by the State, and such
funds may also be used in lieu of State funds to match unobligated
balances of previous apportionments of regular Federal-aid
appropriations.
(c) All contracts involving the expenditure of such grants shall
contain provisions establishing minimum rates of wages, to be pre-
determined by the State highway department, which contractors
shall pay to skilled and unskilled labor, and such minimum rates
shall be stated in the invitation for bids and shall be included in
proposals for bids for the work.
(d) In the expenditure of such amounts, the limitations in the
Federal Highway Act, approved November 9, 1921, as amended and
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supplemented, upon highway construction, reconstruction, and
bridges within municipalities and upon payments per mile which
may be made from Federal funds, shall not apply.
(e) As used in this section the term “ State ” includes the Territory
of Hawaii and the District of Columbia. The term “ highway ” as
defined in the Federal Highway Act approved November 9, 1921.
as amended and supplemented, for the purposes of this section, shall
be deemed to include such main parkways as may be designated by
the State and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture as part of the
Federal -aid highway system.
(f) Whenever, in connection with the construction of any highway
project under this section or section 202 of this Act, it is necessary
to acquire rights of way over or through any property or tracts of
land owned and controlled bj' the Government of the United States,
it shall be the duty of the proper official of the Government of the
United States having control of such property or tracts of land with
the approval of the President and the Attorney General of the
United States, and without any expense whatsoever to the United
States, to perform any acts and to execute any agreements necessary
to grant the rights of way so required, but if at any time the land
or the property the subject of the agreement shall cease to be used
for the purposes of the highway, the title in and the jurisdiction
over the land or property shall automatically revert to the Govern-
ment of the United States and the agreement shall so provide.
(g) Hereafter in the administration of the Federal Highway Act,
and Acts amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto, the first
paragraph of section 9 of said Act shall not apply to publicly owned
toll bridges or approaches thereto, operated by the highway depart-
ment of any State, subject, however, to the condition that all tolls
received from the operation of any such bridge, less the actual cost
of operation and maintenance, shall be applied to the repayment of
the cost of its construction or acquisition, and when the cost of its
construction or acquisition shall have been repaid in full, such bridge
thereafter shall be maintained and operated as a free bridge.
Sec. 205. (a) Not less than $50,000,000 of the amount made avail-
able by this Act shall be allotted for (A) national forest highways,
(B) national forest roads, trails, bridges, and related projects, (C)
national park roads and trails in national parks owned or authorized,
(D) roads on Indian reservations, and (E) roads through public
lands, to be expended in the same manner as provided in paragraph
(2) of section 301 of the Emergency Relief and Construction Act
of 1932, in the case of appropriations allocated for such purposes,
respectively, in such section 301, to remain available until expended.
(b) The President may also allot funds made available by this
Act for the construction, repair, and improvement of public high-
ways in Alaska, the Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
Sec. 206. All contracts let for construction projects and all
loans and grants pursuant to this title shall contain such provisions
as are necessary to insure (1) that no convict labor shall be employed
on any such project; (2) that (except in executive, administrative,
and supervisory positions), so far as practicable and feasible, no
individual directly employed on any such project shall be permitted
to work more than thirty hours in any one week; (3) that all em-
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ployees shall be paid just and reasonable wages which shall be
compensation sufficient to provide, for the hours of labor as limited,
a standard of living in decency and comfort; (4) that in the employ-
ment of labor in connection with any such project, preference shall
be given, where they are qualified, to ex-service men with dependents,
and then in the following order: (A) To citizens of the United States
and aliens who have declared their intention of becoming citizens,
who are bona fide residents of the political subdivision and/or county
in which the work is to be performed, and (B) to citizens of the
United States and aliens who have declared their intention of becom-
ing citizens, who arc bona fide residents of the State, Territory, or
district in which the work is to be performed : Provided
,
That these
preferences shall apply only where such labor is available and quali-
fied to perform the work to which the employment relates; and
(5) that the maximum of human labor shall be used in lieu of
machinery wherever practicable and consistent with sound economy
and public advantage.
Sec. 207. (a) For the purpose of expediting the actual construc-
tion of public works contemplated by this title and to provide a
means of financial assistance to persons under contract with the
United States to perform such construction, the President is author-
ized and empowered, through the Administrator or through such
other agencies as he may designate or create, to approve any assign-
ment executed by any such contractor, with the written consent of
the surety or sureties upon the penal bond executed in connection
with his contract, to any national or State bank, or his claim against
the United States, or any part of such claim, under such contract;
and any assignment so approved shall be valid for all purposes, not-
withstanding the provisions of sections 3737 and 3477 of the Revised
Statutes, as amended.
(b) The funds received by a contractor under any advances made
in consideration of any such assignment are hereby declared to be
trust funds in the hands of such contractor to be first applied to
the payment of claims of subcontractors, architects, engineers, sur-
veyors, laborers, and material men in connection with the project,
to the payment of premiums on the penal bond or bonds, and pre-
miums accruing during the construction of such project on insur-
ance policies taken in connection therewith. Any contractor and
any officer, director, or agent of any such contractor, who applies, or
consents to the application of, such funds for any other purpose and
fails to pay any claim or premium hereinbefore mentioned, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine
of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than one
year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be considered as imposing upon
the assignee any obligation to see to the proper application of the
funds advanced by the assignee in consideration of such assignment.
SCRSISTEXCE HOMESTEADS
Sec. 208. To provide for aiding the redistribution of the overbal-
ance of population in industrial centers $25,000,000 is hereby made
available to the President, to be used by him through such agencies
as he ma'y establish and under such regulations as he may make, for
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making loans for and otherwise aiding in the purchase of subsistence
homesteads. The moneys collected as repayment of said loans shall
constitute a revolving fund to be administered as directed by the
President for the purposes of this section.
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Sec. 209. The President is authorized to prescribe such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of
this title, and any violation of any such rule or regulation shall
be punishable by fine of not to exceed $500 or imprisonment not to
'exceed six months, or both.
ISSUE OF SECURITIES AND SINKING FUND
Sec. 210. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to
borrow, from time to time, under the Second Liberty Bond Act,
as amended, such amounts as may be necessary to meet the expendi-
tures authorized by this Act, or to refund any obligations previously
issued under this section, and to issue therefor bonds, notes, certifi-
cates of indebtedness, or Treasury bills of the United States.
(b) For each fiscal year beginning with the fiscal year 1934 there
is hereby appropriated, in addition to and as part of, the cumulative
sinking fund provided by section 6 of the Victory Liberty Loan
Act, as amended, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, for the purpose of such fund, an amount equal to
2y2 per centum of the aggregate amount of the expenditures made
out of appropriations made or authorized under this Act as deter-
mined by the Secretary of the Treasury.
REEMPLOYMENT AND RELIEF TAXES
Sec. 211. (a) Effective as of the day following the date of the
enactment of this Act, section 617 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1932
is amended by striking out “ 1 cent ” and inserting in lieu thereof
“ 1^2 cents ”.
(b) Effective as of the day following the date of the enactment
of this Act, section 617 (c) (2) of such Act is amended by adding
at the end thereof a new sentence to read as follows : “As used in
this paragraph the term ‘ benzol ’ does not include benzol sold for
use otherwise than as a fuel for the propulsion of motor vehicles,
motor boats, or airplanes, and otherwise than in the manufacture or
production of such fuel.”
Sec. 212. Titles IV and V of the Revenue Act of 1932 are amended
by striking out “1934 ” wherever appearing therein and by inserting
in lieu thereof “ 1935 ”. Section 761 of the Revenue Act of 1932 is
further amended by striking out “ and on July 1, 1933 ” and inserting
in lieu thereof “ and on July 1, 1933, and on July 1, 1934,”.
Sec. 213. (a) There is hereby imposed upon the receipt of divi-
dends (required to be included in the gross income of the recipient
under the provisions of the Revenue Act of 1932) by any person
other than a domestic corporation, an excise tax equal to 5 per centum
of the amount thereof, such tax to be deducted and withheld from,
such dividends by the payor corporation. The tax imposed by this
section shall not apply to dividends declared before the date of
the enactment of this Act.
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(b) Every corporation required to deduct and withhold any tax
under this section shall, on or before the last day of the month fol-
lowing the payment of the dividend, make return thereof and pay
the tax to the collector of the district in which its principal place
of business is located, or, if it has no principal place of business
in the United States, to the collector at Baltimore, Maryland.
(c) Every such corporation is hereby made liable for such tax
and is hereby indemnified against the claims and demands of any
person for the amount of any payment made in accordance with the
provisions of this section.
(d) The provisions of sections 115, 771 to 774, inclusive, and 1111-
cf the Revenue Act of 1932 shall be applicable with respect to the
tax imposed by this section.
(e) The taxes imposed by this section shall not apply to the divi-
dends of any corporation enumerated in section 103 of the Revenue
Act of 1932.
» Sec. 214. Section 104 of the Revenue Act of 1932 is amended by
striking out the words “ the surtax ” wherever occurring in such
section and inserting in lieu thereof “ any internal-revenue tax.”
The heading of such section is amended by striking out “ surtaxes ”
and inserting in lieu thereof “ internal-revenue taxes.” Section
13(c) of such Act is amended by striking out “surtax” and
inserting in lieu thereof “ internal-revenue tax.”
Sec. 215. (a) For each year ending June 30 there is hereby im-
posed upon every domestic corporation with respect to carrying
on or doing business for an}^ part of such year an excise tax of $1
for each $1,000 of the adjusted declared value of its capital stock.
(b) For each year ending June 30 there is hereby imposed upon
every foreign corporation with respect to carrying on or doing busi-
ness in the United States for any part of such year an excise tax
equivalent to $1 for each $1,000 of the adjusted declared value of
capital employed in the transaction of its business in the United
States.
(c) The taxes imposed by this section shall not apply
—
(1) to any corporation enumerated in section 103 of the Revenue
Act of 1932;
(2) to any insurance company subject to the tax imposed by
section 201 or 204 of such Act;
(3) to any domestic corporation in respect of the year ending
June 30, 1933, if it did not carry on or do business during a part
of the period from the date of the enactment of this Act to June
30, 1933, both dates inclusive; or
(4) to any foreign corporation in respect of the year ending
June 30, 1933, if it did not carry on or do business in the United
States during a part of the period from the date of the enactment
of this Act to June 30, 1933, both dates inclusive.
(d) Every corporation liable for tax under this section shall make
a return under oath within one month after the close of the year
with respect to which such tax is imposed to the collector for the
district in which is located its principal place of business or, if it
has no principal place of business in the United States, then to the
collector at Baltimore, Maryland. Such return shall contain such
information and be made in such manner as the Commissioner with
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the approval of the Secretary may by regulations prescribe. The
tax shall, without assessment by the Commissioner or notice from
the collector, be due and payable to the collector before the expira-
tion of the period for filing the return. If the tax is not paid when
due, there shall be added as part of the tax interest at the rate of 1
per centum a month from the time when the tax became due until
paid. All provisions of law (including penalties) applicable in
respect of the taxes imposed by section 600 of the Revenue Act of
1926 shall, in so far as not inconsistent with this section, be applicable
in respect of the taxes imposed by this section. The Commissioner
may extend the time for making the returns and paying the taxes
imposed by this section, under such rules and regulations as he may
prescribe with the approval of the Secretary, but no such extension
shall be for more than sixty days.
(e) Returns required to be filed for the purpose of the tax imposed
by this section shall be open to inspection in the same manner, to
the same extent, and subject to the same provisions of law, including
penalties, as returns made under title II of the Revenue Act of 1926.
(f) For the first year ending June 30 in respect of which a tax
is imposed by this section upon any corporation, the adjusted declared
value shall be the value, as declared by the corporation in its first
return under this section (which declaration of value cannot be
amended), as of the close of its last income-tax taxable year ending
at or prior to the close of the year for which the tax is imposed by
this section (or as of the date of organization in the case of a corpo-
ration having no income-tax taxable year ending at or prior to the
close of the year for which the tax is imposed by this section). For
any subsequent year ending June 30, the adjusted declared value in
the case of a domestic corporation shall be the original declared
value plus (1) the cash and fair market value of property paid in
for stock or shares, (2) paid-in surplus and contributions to capital,
and (3) earnings and profits, and minus (A) the value of property
distributed in liquidation to shareholders, (B) distributions of earn-
ings and profits, and (C) deficits, whether operating or nonoperat-
ing; each adjustment being made for the period from the date as of
which the original declared value was declared to the close of its
last income-tax taxable year ending at or prior to the close of the
year for which the tax is imposed by this section. For any subse-
quent year ending June 30, the adjusted declared value in the case
of a foreign corporation shall be the original declared value adjusted,
in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Commissioner with
the approval of the Secretary, to reflect increases or decreases (for
the period specified in the preceding sentence) in the capital
employed in the transaction of its business in the United States.
(g) The terms used in this section shall have the same meaning
as when used in the Revenue Act of 1932.
Sec. 216. (a) There is hereby imposed upon the net income of
every corporation, for each income-tax taxable year ending after
the close of the first year in respect of which it is taxable under
section 215, an excess-profits tax equivalent to 5 per centum of such
portion of its net income for such income-tax taxable year as is in
excess of 12!/2 per centum of the adjusted declared value of its
capital stock (or in the case of a foreign corporation the adjusted
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declared value of capital employed in the transaction of its business
in the United States) as of the close of the preceding income-tax
taxable year (or as of the date of organization if it had no preceding
income-tax taxable year) determined as provided in section 215. The
terms used in this section shall have the same meaning as when used
in the Revenue Act of 1932.
(b) The tax imposed by this section shall be assessed, collected,
and paid in the same manner, and shall be subject to the same provi-
sions of law (including penalties), as the taxes imposed by title I
of the Revenue Act of 1932.
Sec. 217. (a) The President shall proclaim the date of
—
(1) the close of the first fiscal year ending June 30 of any
year after the year 1933, during which the total receipts of the
United States (excluding public-debt receipts) exceed its total
expenditures (excluding public-debt expenditures other than
those chargeable against such receipts), or
(2) the repeal of the eighteenth amendment to the Consti-
tution,
whichever is the earlier.
(b) Effective as of the 1st dav of the calendar year following the
date so proclaimed section 617(a) of the Revenue Act of 1932, as
amended, is amended by striking out “ iy2 cents ” and inserting in
lieu thereof “ 1 cent
(c) The tax on dividends imposed by section 213 shall not apply
to anv dividends declared on or after the 1st day of the calendar
year following the date so proclaimed.
(d) The capital-stock tax imposed by section 215 shall not apply
to any taxpayer in respect of any year beginning on or after the 1st
day of July following the date so proclaimed.
(e) The excess-profits tax imposed by section 216 shall not apply
to any t axpayer in respect of any taxable year after its taxable year
during which the date so proclaimed occurs.
Sec. 218. (a) Effective as of January 1, 1933, sections 117, 23 (i),
169, 187, and 205 of the Revenue Act or 1932 are repealed.
(b) Effective as of January 1, 1933, section 23 (r) (2) of the Reve-
nue Act of 1932 is repealed.
(c) Effective as of January 1, 1933, section 23 (r) (3) of the Reve-
nue Act of 1932 is amended by striking out all after the word “ Ter-
ritory ” and inserting a period.
(d) Effective as of January 1, 1933, section 182(a) of the Revenue
Act of 1932 is amended by inserting at the end thereof a new sentence
as follows: “No part of any loss disallowed to a partnership as a
deduction by section 23 (r) shall be allowed as a deduction to a
member of such partnership in computing net income.”
(e) Effective as of January 1, 1933, section 141(c) of the Revenue
Act of 1932 is amended by striking out “ except that for the taxable
3
7ears 1932 and 1933 there shall be added to the rate of tax pre-
scribed by sections 13(a), 201(b), and 204(a), a rate of three fourths
of 1 per centum ” and inserting in lieu thereof the following : “ except
that for the taxable years 1932 and 1933 there shall be added to the
'rate of tax prescribed by sections 13(a), 201(b), and 204(a), a rate of
three fourths of 1 per centum and except that for the taxable years
1934 and 1935 there shall be added to tne rate of tax prescribed by
sections 13(a), 201(b), and 204(a), a rate of 1 per centum ”.
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(f) No interest shall be assessed or collected for any period prior
to September 15, 1933, upon such portion of any amount determined
as a deficiency in income taxes as is attributable solely to the amend-
ments made to the Revenue Act of 1932 by this section.
(g) In cases where the effect of this section is to require for a
taxable }Tear ending prior to June 30, 1933, the making of an income-
tax return not otherwise required by law, the time for making the
return and paying the tax shall be the same as if the return was for
a fiscal year ending June 30, 1933.
(h) Section 55 of the Revenue Act of 1932 is amended by inserting
before the period at the end thereof a semicolon and the following:
“ and all returns made under this Act after the date of enactment
of the National Industrial Recovery Act shall constitute public
records and shall be open to public examination and inspection to
such extent as shall be authorized in rules and regulations promul-
gated by the President ”.
Sec. 219. Section 500 (a) (1) of the Revenue Act of 1926, as
amended, is amended by striking out the period at the end of the
second sentence thereof and inserting in lieu thereof a comma and
the following : “ except that no tax shall be imposed in the case of
persons admitted free to any spoken play (not a mechanical repro-
duction), whether or not set to music or with musical parts or accom-
paniments, which is a consecutive narrative interpreted by a single
set of characters, all necessary to the development of the plot, in
two or more acts, the performance consuming more than 1 hour and
45 minutes of time.”
APPROPRIATION
Sec. 220. For the purposes of this Act, there is hereby authorized
to be appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, the sum of $3,300,000,000. The President is author-
ized to allocate so much of said sum, not in excess of $100,000,000, as
he may determine to be necessary for expenditures in carrying out
the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the purposes, powers, and func-
tions heretofore and hereafter conferred upon the Farm Credit
Administration.
Sec. 221. Section 7 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, approved
May 12, 1933, is amended by striking out all of its present terms and
provisions and substituting therefor the following:
“ Sec. 7. The Secretary shall sell the cotton held by him at his
discretion, but subject to the foregoing provisions: Provided
,
That
he shall dispose of all cotton held by him by March 1, 1936 : Provided5
further
,
That notwithstanding the provisions of section 6, the Sec-
retary shall have authority to enter into option contracts with pro-
ducers of cotton to sell to the producers such cotton held by him, in
such amounts and at such prices and upon such terms and conditions
as the Secretary may deem advisable, in combination with rental or
benefit payments provided for in part 2 of this title.
“Notwithstanding any provisions of existing law, the Secretary
of Agriculture may in the administration of the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act make public such information as he deems necessary in
order to effectuate the purposes of such Act.”
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TITLE III—AMENDMENTS TO EMERGENCY RELIEF
AND CONSTRUCTION ACT AND MISCELLANEOUS
PROVISIONS
Section 301. After the expiration of ten days after the date upon
which the Administrator has qualified and taken office, (1) no
application shall be approved by the Reconstruction Finance Cor-
poration under the provisions of subsection (a) of section 201 of
the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932, as amended, and
(2) the Administrator shall have access to all applications, files, and
records of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation relating to loans
and contracts and the administration of funds under such subsec-
tion: Provided
,
That the Reconstruction Finance Corporation may
issue funds to a borrower under such subsection (a) prior to January
23, 1939, under the terms of any agreement or any commitment
to bid upon or purchase bonds entered into with such borrower pur-
suant to an application approved prior to the date of termination,
under this section, of the power of the Reconstruction Finance Cor-
poration to approve applications.
DECREASE OF BORROWING POWER OF RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE
CORPORATION
Sec. 302. The amount of notes
;
debentures, bonds, or other such
obligations which the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is author-
ized and empowered under section 9 of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation Act, as amended, to have outstanding at any one time is
decreased by $400,000,000.
SEPARABILITY CLAUSE
Sec. 303. If any provision of this Act, or the application thereof
to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of
the Act, and the application of such provision to other persons or
circumstances, shall not be affected thereby.
SHORT TITLE
Sec. 304. This Act may be cited as the “ National Industrial
Recovery Act.”





THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
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1. In your opinion, what have been some of the effects, if any,
of the Wagner Act up-to-date?





Note: If space is lacking between questions, please complete




How has the Act affected, or is affecting, employers
in your opinion? Is it beneficial or detrimental?
4.
How has the Act affected, or is affecting, employees
in your opinion? Is it beneficial or detrimental?
5.
Has the Act strengthened or weakened Labor Organizations?





What effects has the Act had on your organization?
7.
Have the attitudes of the employees and employers
changed any since the Act was enacted? In what
manner?
8.
Are the purposes of the Act (develop collective
bargaining, diminish the causes of labor disputes,
etc.) being accomplished?
9. Are you at present in favor of or opposed to the Act?

What, in your opinion, are some of the weaknesses of
the Wagner Act that will tend to make it a failure o
will tend to break down its objectives?
Have you any objections to the use of your name to




Questionnaire wps sent to the following nensons
Persons who opposed the Act:
Robert T. Caldwell,




Yale and Towne Manufacturing Co.
Yew York, N. Y.
George B. Chandler





National Electrical Manufacturers Ass.
New York, N. Y.
Walter G. Merritt
Lean-tie fo -” Industrial Rivhts









New York, N. Y.
James Moore
T’he Renub lie Steel Corporation
Cleveland, 0b io.
Harvey J. Kelly
The American Newspaper Publishers Ass
.
New York, N. Y.
James D. Cunningham





Cate^-nil ] ar Tractor Co.
Peoria, Illinois
Cheries Davis















(Persons who opposed the act- continued)
James L. Donnelly




New York, N. Y.
Harvey G. HIland
The Institute of American Meat Packers
Chicago, Illinois
James A . Emery
National Association of Manufacturers
New York, N. Y.
Abraham G. Feldman






Lake Superior I^on 0r<=> Ass.
Cleveland .Ohio
Guy E. Mitchell
Steubenville Works of the The Wheeling Ste^l Corp.
Steubenville, Ohio
William B. Hadden




American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
Toledo, Ohio
Harold H. Whitehead











(persons who opoosed the continued)
Robert I. Pierce
Manufacturing Industries in Chicago Heights
Chicago, Illinois
George W. Elliott
Chamber of Comm® red
Philadelphia, Pa.




Employees' Mutual Benefit Association cf














The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.
Arkon, Ohio
George B. Chandler
Ohio Chamber of Commerce
Columbus, Ohio
Robert W. Muir
Jewel Tea Co., Inc.
Barrington, Illinois
E. R. Lederer
Texas ft Pacific Coal & Oil. Co.
Fort Yiforth, Texas .
Wendell E. Whipp












Robert C . Graham,
The Graham-Paige Motors Corn.
Detroit, Michigan
Mr. E. J. Poole
Carpenter Steal Co.
Read inn-, Pa
Arno P . Mowitz





120 Broadway, New ^ork City
Paul Frank
Louisvill Gas & Electric Co.
Louis vi11, Kentucky
Albert L. Scott
National Ass. of Finishers of Textile Fabrics
New York, N. Y.
Millard D. Brown






The Bethlehem Steel Co, Maryland Plant
Sparrows Point, Maryland.

Persons w^.o favored the Wagner bill:
William H. Davis
The Twentieth Century Fund, Inc.
New York, N. Y.
Robert M. Buck
The American Newsoaoer Guild, Region 13
Washington, D.C.
James J. Bambrick
1450 Broadway. Room 1700
New York, N. Y.
Thomas Breslan
Beaver Lodge of the Amalgamated Ass. of
Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, Lodge No. 200
Aliouipna, Pennsylvania
A. Steve Nance




New York, N. Y.
James Myers
Federal Council of the Churches of Christ
in America
New York, N. Y.




Grand Central Post Office
New York, N. Y.
John Frey
Metal Trades Deoartment of American Federtion
of Labor.
New York, N. Y.
Professor F. A. Mil] is
University of Chicago
Chicago, Ilinois






New York, N. Y.





John A . Ryan
National Catholic Welfare Conference
Washington, D.C.
Jeremiah T. Mahoney
Phillips, Mahoney, Leibell Fieldino-
New York, N. Y.
Dr. Sidney E. Goldstein
Social Justice Commission of Central
Conference of American Rabbis
New York, N. Y.
Edward E
. S • Keohart
Allied Amalgamated Asociation of Iron,
Steel, and Tin Workers
Pittsburgh, Pa.
James M. Myles







The American Federation of Labor
New Yerk, N. Y.
F. M. Robertson
Frown & Williamson Tobacco Cornoration
Louisville, Kentucky
William Cooke










W . B . Donharn































Beaver Lode-e of the Amalgamated Ass.










Mr. L. B. Palmer
American Newspaner Publishers Ass.
370 Lexington Avenue
New York, N. Y.
G. 0. Bailey
American Teleohone & Tele^r^nh Co.
New York
Roy A. MacGregor













(nersons who favored the bill continued)
D. Lane Powers
John A. Roeblinc*s Sons Co.
Trenton. N. J.
Fred T^irschhorn
General Cigar Co., Inc.
New York, N. Y.
Edwin C . Smith









Automotive Parts & Equipment Manufacturers,
Detroit, Michigan
P. R. Mallory Co.
National Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc.
Brooklyn, N. Y.
Charles Wesley Dunn
Associated Grocery Manufacturers of America




J . F . Woodbury
New Mexico Mining Corporation
Silver City. New Mexico
Francis P. Fenton














"Labor Problems In American Industry"
Houghton-Mifflin Co.; 1933.
Madden, James
"The New Labor Relations Board"
The American Labor Legislation, 'December, 1935.
National Labor Relations Board:
Hearings before the Committee on Education and
Labor; United States Senate, 74th Congress.
Part I; II; III.
Published by the United States Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1935.
Spencer, William H.
"The National Labor Relations Act"
The Journal of Business of the University
of Chicago; The University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, Illinois; October, 1935.
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1933





Crowell Publishing Co., 1921.
Yoeder, Duke
"Labor Economics and Labor Problems"
National Labor Relations Act
Available from the Denartment of Labor
Washington, D.C.
Senate Report, No. 573 (Renort on the Wagner Act)
Available from the Denartment of Labor
Washington, D.C.
National Industrial Recovery Act.




The following, all dating back to February, 1935, have













Pe rs onne 1 Journa 1
.
Volume 14, No. 6 ; December, 1935
The United States News
.
The Worcester Evening Post.
The Worcester Sunday Telegram.
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